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Taxation of Reservation Wealth
I.

INTRODUCTION

Taxation has become one of the most controversial issues in Indian
affairs. As tribes take advantage of federal economic development
programs and as reservations' reserves of natural resources become
increasingly more valuable, there is more on Indian reservations to
tax.1 The federal government appears anxious for tribes to assume a
greater share of the administrative responsibility and cost of reservation services. 2 Tribal economic development has increased reservations' taxable wealth, but the base is still small relative to tribal revenue requirements because needs are so great and because growth has
attracted immigration. 3 At the same time state and local revenue
systems are under increasing strain. The net effect of reservation economic development, of growing demands for state, local, and tribal
services, and of increasing difficulty in raising local revenues is intensified competition for reservation tax base and more pressure on
the courts to resolve long-standing ambiguities in the law of reservation taxation.
Unfortunately, Indian tax law evolved willy-nilly into a tangle
which is equally aggravating to tribal, state, and federal tax collectors.
Judicial misuse of economics has been a major factor. Judicial analysis of economic transactions tends to be formalistic and preoccupied
with semantics and taxonomy. 4 As a result, the practical effects of decisions- are often at cross-purposes with judges' intentions. This article

1. See generally ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INDIAN PROJECTS FUNDED BY THE EDA (1977); STAFF OF AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, REPORT ON RESERVATION AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION 87-121, 149-67 (Comm. Print 1976); Ruffing, Navajo Mineral Development,
I1 INDIAN HISTORIAN no. 2, at 28 (1978); Schusky, Development by Grantsmanship:
Economic Planning on the Lower Brule Sioux Reservation, 34 HUMAN ORGANIZATION
227 (1975).
2. See Barsh & Trosper, Title I of the Indian Self-Determinationand EducationAssistance Act of 1975, 3 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 261 (1975) (discussing one attempt at returning governing power to tribes).
3. It is difficult to verify tribal officers' reports of recent net reservation in-migration because only the 1950 and 1970 censuses enumerated population by reservations,
and even then only for larger reservations. It is possible, however, to estimate
reservation population changes from county data. In South Dakota, for example, the
population of counties located entirely within reservations increased 5.8% between
1960 and 1970, while the overall population of the state declined 2.2%. Compiled from
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION: SOUTH DAKOTA 43-14 to 43-25
(1973).
4. See R. Barsh, The Washington Fishing Rights Controversy: An Economic Critique 1, 43-57 (Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Washington,
Monograph Series 1977).
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will consider the most important Indian tax decisions, comparing the
intended results of the decisions in the context of congressional Indian
law with their probable economic consequences. Part II briefly reviews the main factors essential for proper economic evaluation of a
tax. Part III critically surveys recent law of federal taxation of
reservation wealth. Part IV similarly surveys and criticizes decisions
regarding state taxation of reservation wealth. Part V offers alternate
resolutions for state-Indian taxation disputes. In Part VI, the article
proposes a framework for applying tax economics productively to the
problem of meeting tribal revenue needs.
II.

PRINCIPLES OF TAX EVALUATION

A.

The Forms and Functions of Taxation

We usually think of a tax as a bill for public works and services. To
an economist, however, a "tax" is anything done by government that
increases the cost of transactions. 5 A tax in this more general sense
may be difficult to identify and measure. For example, public regulation of business in the form of limitations, restrictions, conditions, and
requirements of disclosure and filing tends to make regulated activities more costly. Businesses pay part of this regulatory tax in the form
of higher material or production costs needed to meet government
standards. Part of the tax may also be paid to lawyers, accountants,
consultants, bureaucrats, and other people businesses must deal with
to comply with the regulations. We hope that the tax will also benefit
the people our legislators intended to aid by the regulation in the first
place. Thus, while we are most familiar with explicit taxes which involve a direct payment of money, other kinds of taxes are created by
public action that results in changes in citizens' relative wealth.
Taxation may serve four major functions: (1) revenue-raising, (2)
regulation, (3) redistribution, and (4) fiscal stabilization. A tax may be
used to raise funds to pay for public services. Even in a market economy there are important goods and services individual citizens simply
cannot buy for themselves. 6 In such cases, the only alternative to pub5. See generally Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MANAGEMENT
Sci. 22 (1971).
6. National defense is an extreme case, and accordingly the one most often called
upon by economists to make this point. There are many less obvious but equally important examples of public goods. Roads and bridges and other major public works are
very costly, require comprehensive planning, and do not pay for themselves for many
years.
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lic operation is operation by a private monopoly which can coordinate all related activities and charge everyone in society for the use of
its services. 7 Out of self-interest, however, a private monopoly may
charge too much for its services or, without fear of competition, provide them badly. Evaluation of revenue taxation therefore always entails four questions: Does the tax support an activity that cannot be
provided efficiently by competitive private enterprise? Who benefits
from the activity and should therefore pay for it? Should the beneficiaries pay at rates reflecting differences in consumption? Which kind
of tax generates the greatest net yield?
Another function of taxation is regulation. We often use variable
taxes to change the way people behave.8 Taxing an activity harder
discourages it; giving the activity a relative tax break encourages it.
The practical effectiveness of a regulatory tax depends on several factors. The activity to be changed must be precisely identified. Collected from the wrong taxpayers, the tax will be ineffective and may
have unintended side effects. 9 A regulatory tax also will be ineffective
unless it is levied in such a way that taxpayers have an opportunity to
avoid it, or, in the case of a tax subsidy, to take advantage of it. A retroactive tax cannot change behavior. An ambiguous or uncertain tax
likewise is less effective in influencing behavior. Although differences
in personal preferences mean that a regulatory tax will be more or less
effective on different people, 10 we generally tax classes of people at
the same rate. While this is relatively inexpensive to administer, it results only in an average reduction in the incidence of the taxed activity.
A third function of taxation is redistributing income. Many of us
7. If goods such as education, public health, or national defense were provided for
through private markets, without coercive power to make all contribute, some beneficiaries would inevitably get a free ride.
8. Rather than to think of taxes as analogous to the positive commands of law, it
may be more useful to think of the positive commands of law as taxes. If you violate a
proscriptive law, something unpleasant is done to you. Often this is a requirement that
you pay the government some money. This taxes your activity. More specificially, the
tax on the activity is equal to the average penalty discounted by the probability you will
be discovered and forced to pay it. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 277-82 (1968); G. TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAW 211-27 (1971).

9. When it is difficult to isolate the target activity, some more easily identified antecedent or subsequent activity may be taxed instead. In such cases the effectiveness of
the tax is also a function of the correlation between the target activity and the activity
taxed.

10. People who place a higher value on an activity will bear a higher tax before giving it up. To reduce everyone's participation in the taxed activity by an equal amount a
regulatory tax would have to tax each person at a different rate, based on the value of
the taxed activity for that person.
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value the experience of participating in a society in which all citizens
enjoy a minimum standard of living. We are willing to pay for this experience by imposing a tax cost on ourselves to support redistributive
programs. These taxes are not limited to people who believe in income redistribution, however. In principle we allocate them most
heavily to the "deepest pocket." Public sentiment, as well as considerations of revenue maximization and administrative efficiency, support
taxing the rich because they are rich. The expenditure of tax proceeds
is as important as the character of the tax collected in determining tax
effects. 1 A proportional income tax invested entirely in benefits serving one sector of society can be highly redistributive, while a progressive income tax schedule can be rendered proportional in net effect if
2
tax-financed benefits are proportional to taxes paid.'
The fourth kind of tax function is fiscal stabilization.1 3 Fiscal
stabilization is the process of evening out fluctuations in unemployment and output. Some taxes have an automatic stabilizing effect.
General taxes on net income or consumption expand and contract
with aggregate social output. Public expenditures and reductions in
general income and consumption tax rates tend to stimulate output,
while curtailing expenditures or increasing tax rates have the opposite
effect. Combined with control of the money supply, power to tax and
spend enables government to affect the level of prices and unemployment without direct selective regulation.
A tax may be regulatory, redistributive, stabilizing, or for the purpose of financing public goods. In pure form, revenue taxes are allocated on the basis of benefit to be received from expenditure of tax
funds, regulatory taxes according to the activities they are designed to
modify, and redistributive taxes in an inverse function of wealth. It is
impossible, however, to treat any real-world tax as being of only one
or another type. Deliberately or unwittingly, we mix the functions of
taxes. Our federal income tax is a perfect example of a tax that intentionally serves all four tax functions. A deduction is never simply a
regulatory subsidy. Its enforcement affects the aggregate yield of the
II.

See generally Gillespie, Effect of Public Expenditures on the Distributionof In-

come, in ESSAYS IN FISCAL FEDERALISM 122 (R. Musgrave ed. 1965).

12. Similar phenomena occur for the other functions of taxation. For example, our
current national policy specially taxes tobacco producers by means of excise taxes and
marketing restrictions on an activity-reducing theory, while simultaneously diverting
national tax revenues to support tobacco prices on an activity-increasing basis. The net
effect is important.
13. See generally R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 535-66 (1973); J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 10-14 (3d ed. 1971).
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tax and therefore both the level of public services and the redistribution of income. Rational construction of a tax code involves numerous trade-offs among goals.
B.

The Economic Incidence of Taxation

Taxpayers are often able to shift all or part of their tax burden to
others in the course of private transactions. How much shifting occurs
and, accordingly, how much of the tax burden each taxpayer really
bears depends on the kinds of transactions taxpayers engage in with
one another, not the way in which taxes are collected or upon whom
the legal liability falls. This is the part of tax evaluation which courts
14
most often seem to miss.
1.

Taxes on consumption

Recent litigation of state taxation of reservations often involves
taxes on consumption. 15 A tax on consumer goods 16 may be collected
while the goods are in the hands of the manufacturer, as in the case of
federal liquor taxes; or when they are delivered to a wholesaler, as is
done with cigarettes; or as a surcharge on the price of the goods paid
by consumers to retailers, such as a conventional "sales" tax; or as a
tax payable by the consumer some time after purchase of the goods,
which is referred to as a "use" or "property" tax. It is possible to
collect a tax on consumption at any point in the chain of distribution,
from raw material to garbage heap.
Tax administrators naturally prefer to levy taxes where the taxed
goods are in the hands of relatively few people, where they are in the
hands of people who can pay the tax in cash at once, or where the

14. See, e.g., Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 481-82
(1976).
15. See, e.g., Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976)

(cigarette tax); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Washington, No. C78-783V (W.D. Wash.
Mar. 8, 1979) (order granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment) (liquor sales
regulation and taxation); Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978) (three-judge court) (cigarette tax and general sales tax), appeal docketed, No. 78-630 (S. Ct. Oct. 13, 1978), considerationof jurisdictionpostponed to hearing on merits, 99 S. Ct. 1210 (1979).
16. For the purpose of incidence analysis it makes little difference under

competitive conditions whether these taxes are collected as a flat unit markup or as an
ad valorem (percentage) markup. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supranote 13, at 43 1.
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goods can be simply and conveniently counted. 17 This reduces the total cost of collecting the tax and therefore increases its net yield. The
point of enforcement cannot affect the ultimate distribution of the
burden of the tax, however. Suppose a tax is levied on wholesalers.
Wholesalers may shift all or a part of this cost to retailers by raising
wholesale prices. Retailers in turn may shift all or a part of increased
wholesale prices to consumers by raising retail prices. Or wholesalers
may respond by paying less to suppliers, by decelerating wage increases for employees, by paying reduced dividends to stockholders,
or by some combination of these means. The owners and employees
of each firm in the chain of distribution are also themselves consumers of the taxed product. A process of adjustment will occur at every
step in the chain of distribution backwards and forwards from the
point of enforcement. Figure 1 illustrates the systems relationship
among taxables.
How much of a particular tax on goods will be shifted by the initial
taxpayer depends in the first instance on the tax's selectivity. Selective
consumption taxes are usually called "excise" taxes. 1 8 Since consumers can avoid a selective tax by purchasing untaxed goods, sellers have
an incentive to absorb the tax. Moreover, if consumers avoid a selective tax on A by buying less A and more B, the increased demand for
B increases its price. This forces consumers of untaxed goods to bear
a part of the burden of selective taxes.' 9 The proportion of tax that is
shifted by consumers to sellers or that sellers cannot shift to consumers is a function of the "price elasticity of demand," or responsiveness
of consumer behavior to price changes. Demand for a good is said to
17. Small jurisdictions will choose to levy taxes on those phases of production which
predominate within their borders. This is a revenue-maximizing strategy. A state where
paper is manufactured prefers to tax gross output rather than retail sales of paper. This
can be a problem for a multistate enterprise, as each state will try to tax the whole firm
through its in-state subsidiaries. Id. at 306.
18. "Excise" taxes are usually thought of as taxes on particular goods, such as motor
vehicles and fuels, liquor, and tobacco products. Years ago these excises were popularly
called "luxury taxes" because they were often justified as failing only on unnecessary
expenditures. They did not, it was supposed, hurt anyone's ability to secure the basics of
life. Today some are described as "vice" or "demerit" taxes in the belief that they help
limit the frequency of mildly undesirable activities.
19. Firms may price on other than revenue-maximizing criteria. R. MUSGRAVE & P.
MUSGRAVE, supra note 13, at 404-05. Some examples are markup pricing, breakeven or
investment-recovery pricing, pricing in accordance with fixed rate-of-return goals, and
pricing to maximize gross sales. In such cases the tax may be shifted to consumers with
little or no effect on volume up to the point that the after-tax price exceeds demand. See
also id. at 423-32; J. PECHMAN & B. OKNER, WHO BEARS THE TAX BURDEN? 35 (1974)
(effect on corporate income tax incidence if firms do not operate on profit-maximizing
assumption).

538

Taxation of Reservation Wealth
FIGURE 1
THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF FACTORS OF PRODUCTION

arrows represent
flows of private wealth

be relatively price inelastic if changes in price result in relatively small
changes in consumption. 20 Price elasticity varies with the price of the
good and can be determined only by observation of consumer
behavior.
Consumers' share of a selective consumption tax is proportional to
the price inelasticity of demand. Sellers can shift a tax to consumers
by raising prices only to the extent that consumers will not give up the
taxed goods. 21 When the tax is levied initially on consumers, sellers
can avoid lowering the price and thus sharing part of the tax only to
20. Demand is "infinitely" elastic if there is only one price, and any change results
in zero consumption; similarly, demand is "perfectly inelastic" when consumption is
unaffected by price.
21. If consumers are willing to give up the taxed good, the seller will have to absorb
part of the tax himself by increasing price in an amount less than the tax. Tax-sharing
between sellers and consumers also depends on the price elasticity of supply, which is
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the same extent. In either case, it is irrelevant whether the tax is first
levied on sellers or consumers. 22 Excise taxes on motor fuels, liquor,
and tobacco are popular among tax administrators because of the
price inelasticity of demand for the taxed goods; the tax base is relatively unaffected by imposition of the tax. Any selective tax nevertheless affects consumption and discourages investment in the production
and distribution of the taxed good. Capital and labor move from the
taxed sector to untaxed sectors, lowering factor costs and prices.
Therefore, a part of the tax burden is imposed on untaxed industries.
The overall effect is to distort the free market allocation of resources
and the mix of consumption that maximizes consumer utility. The
cost of this distortion is often described as "excess burden" because it
is in excess of tax costs converted to public revenue. Tax burdens slice
the national output pie differently between public and private sectors.
Excess burdens reduce pie size.
2.

Property taxes

Property taxes are of two kinds: periodic taxes on consumer goods
and taxes on capital. A tax on housing is a periodic tax on a consumer
good, housing services, collected in annual installments. Homeowners, of course, bear this tax and cannot shift it to another. But because
demand for rental housing is usually relatively price inelastic, most of
a tax on rental owners probably is shifted to tenants. To the extent
that a tax on housing is borne by owners of rental property, investment in the construction and maintenance of housing is discouraged
and capital flows to other investment sectors, reducing housing stock
and thereby raising the average rent.
Owners of productive property can avoid tax only by reinvesting in
an untaxed sector. However, they can sell their taxed property and
reinvest elsewhere only after the tax has reduced their property's net
worth. 23 In the short run, owners of productive property therefore
the relationship of supply to price. In the exceptional case where producers' output remains unchanged regardless of market conditions (perfectly inelastic supply), it is a
buyer's market and consumers bear none of any tax on the goods. Typically, however,
supply is elastic, just as is demand. The more elastic supply, the greater the seller's ability to shift taxes forward to consumers. R. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 13, at
433-34.
22. It is also irrelevant for this purpose whether the tax is levied as a single tax or as

a series of stage-by-stage value-added taxes. Id. at 306, 423.
23. Owners of buildings may permit them to deteriorate, using up their depreciable
value, rather than selling. This helps explain the proliferation of urban "slumlording"
under rising property tax rates.
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bear the full tax. 24 In the long run, investment in property is discouraged. Investment in other sectors increases, increasing the supply of
capital and decreasing the return on investment in those sectors. In
this way the tax is shared by all owners of capital.
American property taxes are selective in that they apply to some
forms of productive wealth but not to others. Real capital such as
land, plants, and machinery is taxed, while securities, commercial paper, demand deposits, intangibles like copyrights, and cash are exempt. A truly general wealth tax would preserve the efficient allocation of productive factors to industries. Our selective property tax
distorts the allocation of factors by favoring industries in which the
ratio of real capital to other factors is low. In an industry where machinery is more efficient than labor, for example, a property tax on
machinery will encourage the substitution of labor. This is the excess
burden of the tax.
3.

Income taxes

Income taxes bear a very close relationship to property taxes.
While sales taxes are levied on consumption, both income and property taxes fall on the factors of production. A property tax applies to
the net value of the factor measured by its market price; an income
tax to the net value of the income, of the factor (labor or capital)
measured by wages, interest, dividends, and profits. Like property
taxes, income taxes tend to be borne by owners of the taxed factors. A
general net income tax would reduce the yield of all factors proportionally and therefore have no significant reallocative effect. However, capital gains are taxed at a discriminatorily low rate. Corporate
income is taxed twice, first as earnings and then as dividends. In the
long run capital is completely mobile, so these exceptions should result in reallocation.
Whether an income tax on business can be shifted to labor, or a tax
on wages shifted to business, are much-debated questions,
complicated by inconsistent empirical studies and differing assumptions about the nature of the labor supply.2 5 Some tax on business
24. It is assumed that business cannot shift the property tax to consumers. Shifting is
unlikely because property taxes vary greatly among localities. If businesses in high-tax
localities tried to shift by raising prices they would lose sales to businesses in low-tax localities.
25. See, e.g., R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 13, at 382-90, 396-411; J.
PECHMAN & B. OKNER, supra note 19, at 30, 34-35. If we assume that wages are maximized relative to the net earnings of the firm prior to the imposition of the tax, employees'
ability to shift the burden to their employers depends on their employers' ability to shift
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may be shifted to labor because the labor supply is both relatively
fixed and relatively non-mobile. If employees are unable or unwilling
to avoid tax shifting by going to work elsewhere, they will bear a part
of any increase in business taxes.
American income taxes are nominally progressive. Whether they
are to be considered progressive in fact depends upon many assumptions, especially regarding employers' ability to shift taxes to employees. Interestingly, however, regressive state and local consumption
taxes probably offset any progressivity of the income tax completely,
so that the effective burden of all taxes appears in fact to be propor26
tional across income brackets.
Familiar taxes and their predicted incidence are summarized in
Figure 2. It is important to recognize the relative meaninglessness of
legal labels. The name of a tax or its initial payer are irrelevant. What
the tax does is relevant and is a function of the economic nature of the
tax, its actual incidence, as determined by general prediction and specific measurement, and, always, the economic structure of the taxing
jurisdiction.
C.

Problems and Goals of Intergovernmental Tax Policy

It is difficult enough to coordinate different taxes within a single
taxing jurisdiction so that in combination they synergize rather than
undo one another's objectives. It is much more difficult to plan taxes
in an environment of neighboring and overlapping taxing jurisdictions. When more than one jurisdiction taxes the same transactions,
or some tax and others exempt, none can fully accomplish their goals.
A simple revenue tax will serve as an example of the problems of multiple taxation. Increasing the rate of the tax discourages the taxed activity, so that at some point higher rates result in lower yields. If jurisdiction A is already taxing at the yield-maximizing rate when
jurisdiction B begins to tax, jurisdiction A cannot protect its revenue
by imposing a retaliatory tax rate increase. The rate increase would
actually reduce the aggregate yield of both taxes. Or suppose that jurisdiction A is willing to trade away some revenue for gains in the rate
of growth and therefore selects a tax rate below the yield-maximizing
in turn to consumers (who, of course, include the employees). Wages may be "administered," that is, fixed by regulated union-management negotiations in which equity
rather than the supply of labor is the measure of the wage, and in which new taxes may
be considered an equitable basis for wage increases. An administered wage may also reflect "equitable" shifting of new business taxes to labor.
26. See generally J. PECHMAN & B. OKNER, supra note 19, at 44-65 (1974).
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FIGURE 2.
SOME FAMILIAR TAXES AND THEIR PREDICTED
INCIDENCEa
INCIDENCE

EXCESS BURDEN

general

all consumers

relative consumption of
goods unaltered

selective

distributed between sellers
and consumers of taxed
goods as a function of the
elasticities of supply and
demand

relative consumption of
goods altered

general

consumers of housing and
all owners of capital

relative mix of factors of
production unaltered

selective

in the short run owners of
taxed capital; in the long
run all owners of capital

relative mix of factors of
production altered

income recipients

investment and labor
patterns unaltered

in the short run recipients
of taxed income; in the
long run all income recipients

investment and labor
patterns altered

TYPE OF TAX
SALES

PROPERTY

INDIVIDUAL general
INCOME
selective

a. This table is a simplification based upon assumptions made in the text. "The short
run" is defined as the turnaround time for capital reinvestment.

rate that instead optimizes the mix of revenue and growth. If jurisdiction B now imposes a tax, jurisdiction A loses both revenue and

growth. B's tax may be so high that no reduction in A's rate will restore the growth conditions contemplated by A's original tax scheme.
This would certainly be true if B is interested only in revenue and
27
taxes at the yield-maximizing rate.
Multiple taxation results in tax hierarchies organized by priority.

The United States has a priority over state and local tax authorities as
a creditor of the taxpayer, for example. Tax hierarchies reflect political hierarchies because a jurisdiction can assume a priority only by
27. These problems are alleviated if one jurisdiction allows taxpayers to deduct or
credit tax payments made to the other. The federal income tax schedule permits deduction of state taxes and, as a rule, states permit deduction of federal income taxes. See G.
BREAK, INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONS INTHE UNITED STATES 39-42 (1967); J.
PECHMAN, supra note 13, at 87; Bridges, Allowances for State and Local Nonbusiness
Taxes, in ESSAYS IN FISCAL FEDERALISM 187 (R. Musgrave ed. 1965).
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agreement or by having constitutional power to impose its will on
competing jurisdictions. Difficulties usually arise when two coequal
political subdivisions find themselves competing for the same tax
28
base.
In addition to tax hierarchies there is a "tax geography" resulting
from local tax differentials which are an inevitable part of our system
of political decentralization. This geography can be thought of as consisting of "hills" and "valleys"-places with relatively high and low
aggregate tax burdens. Like water, commerce tends to accumulate in
the deepest valleys. Changing the flow of wealth in this system requires either that the hills be made a little lower or the valleys shallower, so that the net difference in tax burden is reduced. Tax valleys
are unlikely to raise their taxes for the sake of their neighbors. Therefore tax hills must either cut their taxes and absorb a revenue loss or
call on Congress to make adjustments through the national income
tax system and public spending.
Frustration of tax goals as a result of multiple and differential taxation is the price local jurisdictions pay for the privilege of participating in federalism. Local regultory differentials are also costly for business. They involve adaptation to and accounting for many sets of
rules and payment of many different, overlapping, and often inconsistent explicit and implicit taxes. Unequal taxes distort the free market
geographic allocation of capital, labor, and technology, and often
frustrate efficient regional specialization. 29 The framers of the Constitution chose to limit, but not to eliminate, local regulatory differentiation. Local tariffs and duties are constitutionally prohibited, for example, but local domestic taxation is not. Our system balances local
regulatory autonomy against the cost to business and government of
regulatory overlap. 3 0 It is within this federalism model that the law of
taxation of Indian property and tribal areas is best understood.
III.

FEDERAL TAXATION

Tax law is said to be a
locating and construing code
guishing feature of Indian tax
Indians are not mentioned in

matter of statutory interpretation, of
provisions and regulations. The distinlaw, however, is the absence of statutes.
the Internal Revenue Code. Indian tax

28. See generally G. BREAK, supra note 27, at 28-61 (intergovernmental tax coordination).
29.

See R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 13, at 454.

30. See J. MAXWELL, FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 27-32 (rev. ed.
1969) (federalism in intergovernmental financial matters).
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law is a judicial creation in empty legislative space. The result is great
inconsistency in application. 3 1 According to some commentators, federal law regards Indians as beneficiaries of a national trust for their
protection and welfare. 32 The terms of this implied trust are nowhete
spelled out. Nevertheless, the idea of trusteeship throws a rather indistinct shadow on all federal Indian tax law; the very notion of federal
taxation of reservation Indians may be criticized as taxing the benefici33
ary for the benefit of the trustee.
A.

Federal Tax Treatment of Allottees and Assignees of Trust Land

1.

The startingpoint: Squire v. Capoeman

In Squire v. Capoeman,34 a Quinault Indian allottee challenged the
application of the federal capital gains tax to the severance of timber
from his land as a violation of trust. The General Allotment Act 35 im31. See United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1974): "As a matter
of law [an Indian taxpayer] cannot be guilty of willfully evading and defeating income
taxes on income, the taxability of which is so uncertain that even co-ordinate branches
of the United States Government plausibly reach directly opposing conclusions." The
Internal Revenue Service imposes no time limit on Indians' claims for refund of overpaid taxes when the Bureau of Indian Affairs completed the tax returns. Rev. Rul. 68172, 68-1 C.B. 563,
32. See STAFF OF AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, REPORT ON TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE FEDERAL-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP; INCLUDING TREATY REVIEW 2-3,
21-26,47 (Comm. Print 1976).
33. An early opinion of the Attorney General of the United States is an apt example
of the trust concept. The Attorney General was
unable, by implication, to impute to Congress under the broad language of our Internal Revenue Acts an intent to impose a tax for the benefit of the Federal Government on income derived from the restricted property of these wards of the
nation; property the management and control of which rests largely in the hands of
officers of the Government charged by law with the responsibility and duty of protecting the interests and welfare of these dependent people. In other words, it is not
lightly to be assumed that Congress intended to tax the ward for the benefit of the
guardian.
34 OP. ATr'Y GEN. 439, 445 (1925), quoted with approval in Squire v. Capoeman, 351
U.S. 1, 8 (1956).
34. 351 U.S. 1 (1956).
35. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
331-389 (1976)). Indians were individually allotted lands on their reservations, but the
United States government retained title to the lands in trust. Up to 25 years after allotment, the allottees were to receive the lands in fee, discharged of the trust and free of
any incumbrances. 25 U.S.C. §§ 348, 349 (1976). See Capoeman, 351 U.S. at 3. The
policy of allotment was discontinued by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, and the
trust status of already allotted lands was extended indefinitely. Act of June 18, 1934, ch.
576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976)). See 25 U.S.C.
§§ 461,462 (1976).
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posed federal supervision over parcels of this kind, purportedly to
protect Indian possession and to accelerate Indian economic development. 36 When the act was passed in 1887 there was no federal tax applicable to land ownership, but Capoeman arose after enactment of
the national income and capital gains taxes. The Supreme Court faced
an intriguing question for which there was no relevant legislative history: Did the 1887 policy of encouraging individual Indian land development override the subsequent establishment of a national tax
system?
The Court concluded that the protective policy of the allotment
laws had been specific enough to survive enactment of later general
revenue laws. It observed with evident sympathy that the Bureau of
Indian Affairs had determined how, when, and at what price allottees'
timber should be cut; that after severance of the timber Capoeman's
allotment was virtually worthless; and that the United States' use of its
power as trustee to convert Capoeman's tax-exempt property into taxable income seemed to suggest as much a conflict of interest as a conflict of policy. 37 The capital gains tax was inapplicable to Capoeman
because it constituted a direct tax on the value of federally-protected
land. If Capoeman were to reinvest the tax-exempt income, however,
any proceeds of the reinvestment would be taxable. According to the
Court, "it is not necessary to exempt reinvestment income from tax
burdens" in order to implement the federal policy of protecting Indian ownership and encouraging economic development. 38
It is not clear why the implicit protective policy of allotment is
broad enough to immunize the allottee from taxes on land income,
but not from income taxes generally. Any tax on income reduces the
allottee's capital resources and therefore his ability to develop his allotment. 39 In distinguishing between direct land income and reinvestment income for tax purposes, Capoeman read into the General Allotment Act only a limited congressional interest in accelerating Indian
economic development.
Our national income tax system encourages reinvestment by means
36. Capoeman, 351 U.S. at 8, 10.
37. Id. at8, 10.
38. Id. at 9. The distinction between tax-exempt direct income and taxable reinvestment income was also necessary for the Court to distinguish away its earlier decision in
Superintendent of Five Civilized Tribes v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 418, 420-21
(1935).
39. In its brief the government argued that an income tax is "not the same as the tax
on the source of the income, the land." Capoeman, 351 U.S. at 6. A distinction between
a tax on capital and a tax on income from capital is meaningless economically, and the
Court did not accept it.
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of investment tax credits and capital gains treatment of investment
income. According to Capoeman, Congress intended to encourage Indians to invest only in land. This restriction of Indians' relative tax
advantage may result in an inefficient overallocation of reservation
capital to agriculture, forestry, ranching, and other "primary pro40
ducts" industries relative to manufacturing and retailing.
2.

IRS limitations on the scope of Capoeman's tax exemption

For twenty years the Internal Revenue Service has tried to read Capoeman as narrowly as possible. Shortly after the Supreme Court's decision, Revenue Ruling 56-342 exempted from taxation "[i] ncome
...derived directly from [the taxpayer's own] allotted and restricted
Indian lands."'4 1 This formula limits the exemption in two ways: to
income derived from land and to income from the allottee's own allotted land. The meaning of "income derived from land" is, however, far
from clear. Land is a factor, to a greater or lesser extent, in the production of all income. It can be mined, support renewable resources
such as timber and crops, or serve as the site for industrial facilities.
And the income produced from it can help finance everything else.
The ambiguity of the distinction and the IRS reluctance to expand
tax exemptions led to hairsplitting and economically questionable applications. Income from renting the land for ranching or from the sale
42
of hay was directly derived from land and, accordingly, tax-exempt,
but income from the sale of livestock raised by the allottee on the allotment was said not to be derived from the land and so was taxable. 43
40. But cf.Critzer v. United States, 77-2 U.S. TAx CAS. 9540 (Ct. CI. Trial Div.
No. 134-75, July 12, 1977) (proceeds of trust land development are tax-exempt when
reinvested in commercial activities on the land). See notes 60-66 and accompanying
text infra.
41. Rev. Rul. 56-342, 1956-2 C.B. 20. The exempt income included "[rents], royalties, proceeds of sales of the natural resources of such land, and income from the sale
of crops grown upon the land and from the use of the land for grazing purposes." Id. Cf.
Lafontaine v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1976) (Indian's Wages not taxexempt under any treaty or statute).
42. Rev. Rul. 56-342, 1956-2 C.B. 20.
43. Rev. Rul. 58-64, 1958-1 C.B. 12, 13. Revenue Ruling 58-64 was modified in
1960 to correct its most obvious inequities. See note 44 infra. Under the 1958 ruling all

income from the sale of allotment cattle was taxable. Thus, an allottee could sell hay
from his pasture tax-free, or lease the pasture to someone else for grazing and enjoy the

rental income tax-free, but if the allottees raised their own cattle, the proceeds from the
sale, including the value of the allottees' own grazing use of the land, would be taxed.

The 1958 ruling actually penalized Indian uses of the land, although taxing Indian uses
of Indian grazing land and subsidizing the leasing of the land to non-Indians are opposite the goals of the General Allotment Act as interpreted in Capoeman. See note 36
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In 1960 the IRS reconsidered this distinction and proposed to tax the
allottee-rancher only to the extent that his ranching income represented his own labor rather than the productive value of the land. 44
For this purpose the difference between the price of the livestock and
the reasonable rental value of the acreage was treated as the value of
the allottee's labor. 45 Taxing allottee-farmers on the labor component
of crop sale income was not considered, although farm income, like
ranch income, is a product of both land and labor.
In either case, the IRS taxed the behavior Capoeman said Congress
intended to encourage: allottees using their own land. The IRS also
discriminated against ranching as an economic activity. Could Congress have intended to encourage more Indians to become farmers
than ranchers? Some reservations and parts of reservations are better
suited to one or the other of these industries; neither is a "better" economic activity everywhere. The IRS finally made livestock and crop
sales equally tax-exempt in 1962, not out of any policy considerations
but because the calculation of the labor component of livestock proceeds had proven too complicated to apply. 46
Revenue Ruling 56-342 also limited tax exemptions to income
from the Indian allottee's own allotment. 47 On many large reservations, however, tribal land was never allotted or was repurchased by
the tribes from allottees. 48 The 1934 Indian Reorganization Act 4 9 susand accompanying text supra. It might be argued that a tax on the non-Indian lessees'
income would simply be shifted to the Indian lessors in any event, making it immaterial
to the lessor whether he leased or used the land himself. The conventional wisdom
among economists, however, is that income taxes are borne by the taxpayer. J. PECHMAN & B. OKNER, supra note 19, at 26. But suppose, for argument's sake, that lessees'
income taxes are shifted completely to Indian lessors. Since Indian lessors' rental income is tax-exempt they still would enjoy a relative advantage over non-Indian lessors,
while Indian farm or ranch operators would enjoy no tax advantage over non-Indian
farm or ranch operators. The net effect still would be to encourage leasing.
44. Rev. Rul. 60-377, 1960-2 C.B. 13. This modification of Revenue Ruling 58-64
solved the anomaly of taxing an allottee's own use of grazing land while not taxing regrazing value when the allottee leased it to another. This was but a slight improvement.
The tax laws merely no longer penalized Indians' own use of their ranching land, but
they provided' no incentive for an allottee to use his own land rather than lease it or use
it less efficiently in farming.
45. Revenue Ruling 60-377 gave no theory for its allocation of the proceeds of livestock sales into tax-exempt and taxable portions. Rev. Rul. 60-377, 1960-2 C.B. 13.
But according to Revenue Ruling 62-16, the allocation of livestock sales proceeds was
done by the portion "attributable to the land," which was tax-exempt, and the "portion
attributable to other factors, such as labor, the use of equipment, and the like," which
was taxable. Rev. Rul. 62-16, 1962-1 C.B. 7, 8.
46. Rev. Rul. 62-16, 1962-1 C.B. 7,8.
47. Rev. Rul. 56-342, 1956-2 C.B. 20.
48. See STAFF OF AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, supra note 1, at 23.
49. Act ofJune 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
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pended further allotment of tribal lands and provided repurchase financing, reflecting the growing belief that allotments had been too
small to begin with and had been further divided to an inefficient degree as the result of statutory heirship rules.5 0 Unallotted or repurchased tribal land is often leased or assigned to an individual tribal
member for cultivation. Similarly, holders of fractional shares of allotments often transfer or lease their land to an adjacent allottee who
then works the larger combined tract.
Although the Court in Capoeman found a federal tax exemption
for allotments in the implicit policy of Congress, Revenue Ruling 58320 concluded that federal tax exemptions for other kinds of reservation land must be found in the explicit policy of Congress. 51 This
amounts to a presumption in favor of taxability. Since no law expressly exempts repurchased and original unallotted lands from federal taxation, they must be taxable. One purpose of the Indian Reorganization Act was to reverse the diseconomical tendency of allotment
to break up Indian land into unworkably small, noncontiguous
parcels, but Revenue Ruling 58-320 actually subsidized the use of
these unworkably small parcels relative to larger, consolidated tribal
tracts reacquired for tribes with federal funds52 and thus encouraged
capital to flow from federally-financed tribal land developments to al53
lotments.
Revenue Ruling 67-284 and its critics

3.

Revenue Ruling 67-284 is the most recent comprehensive statement of Indian tax regulations. Indian income is exempt only if protected by a specific treaty or federal statutory provision, or if "derived
461-492 (1976)). Especially pertinent are 25 U.S.C. §§ 461, 462, 463(a), 465, 467

(1976). Section 5 of the Act, 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1976), expressly exempts all repurchased
reservation lands from state and local taxation; but the Act makes no references to federal taxation of repurchased land and original unallotted tribal lands.
50. Readjustment of Indian Affairs: Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-29 (1934) (memorandum submitted

by Commissioner of Indian Affairs).
51.
52.

Rev. Rul. 58-320, 1958-1 C.B. 24.
Small, uneconomic parcels are tax-exempt as long as they are used by the allot-

tee. But if small parcels are consolidated for more efficient economic use, the benefit of
tax exemption is lost. Moreover, since as a result of fractional heirship most allottees today can claim only a few acres, an industrious allottee has little choice but to buy out or
lease from fellow heirs and neighbors. Taxing the consolidated portions of farms and
ranches hinders Indian economic growth and, at the extreme, is an incentive for keeping
the allotments fractionated.
53. The only difference between an allottment and a tribal land assignment in current practice is the source of the proprietor's title. The tax thereby becomes a tax on ancestry or inheritance rather than wealth or consumption. The IRS obviously does not
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directly by a noncompetent Indian from allotted and restricted land
held under the General Allotment Act" or a similar law. 54 The rule

preserves allottees' inexplicable and horizontally inequitable tax advantage over other forms of individual Indian landholding and continues the tax advantage of certain forms of land use. Continuing
prior practice, the rule defines income "derived directly" from the
land as rentals, royalties, sales of crops and livestock, sales of natural
resources, and sale of the land itself.55 This appears to exclude commercial development. If an allottee leases to a retailer or manufacturer his rental income is exempt. However, if he operates a business
on his own land, he must pay tax. Leasing and agriculture are subsidized relative to other uses.
The IRS position has, at least in part, been challenged successfully
in the courts. In Stevens v. Commissioner56 the Ninth Circuit
effectively overthrew tax discrimination against allottees' purchases of
additional allotments. The court reasoned that an exemption for purchased lands would be consistent with the Indian Reorganization
agree with the concept that "it is not lightly to be assumed that Congress intended to tax
the ward for the benefit of the guardian." 34 Op. ArT'Y. GEN. 439, 445 (1925).
54. Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, 56. A "noncompetent" Indian is merely
"one who holds allotted lands under a trust patent and may not dispose of his property
without the approval of the Secretary of Interior. It does not denote mental incapacity."
Stevens v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 741, 742 n.1 (9th Cir. 1971).
Revenue Ruling 67-284 outlines the following five-point test to determine the exempt status of Indian land income:
(1) The land must be in trust status, i.e., the record owner is the United States in trust
for an Indian or Indians. Once the United States conveys fee title to the beneficiary the
exemption ceases. See also Rev. Rul. 62-48, 1962-1 C.B. 131 (base for computation of
capital gains on the sale of a former allotment by the "emancipated" allottee).
(2) The land must be allotted to an individual or individuals, not held for the tribe as
a whole.
(3) The income must be "derived directly" from the land, not produced by "reinvestment" of land income. See notes 40 & 41 supra. Directly derived income includes "rentals . . . .royalties, proceeds from the sale of the natural resources of the land, income
from the sale of crops grown upon the land and from the use of the land for grazing
purposes, and income from the sale or exchange of cattle or other livestock raised on the
land," and income from sale of the land itself. Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, 57.
See also Rev. Rul. 69-289, 1969-1 C.B. 34 (agricultural stabilization payments are income "derived directly" from the land); Rev. Rul. 57-407, 1957-2. C.B. 45 (sales of allotted land still held in trust).
(4) If the exemption is claimed under some law other than the General Allotment Act,
the law must "evince congressional intent that the allotment be used as a means of protecting the Indian" until he is "competent," i.e., until he is legally enabled to dispose of
it without federal supervision.
(5) If the exemption is claimed under some law other than the General Allotment Act,
the law must express Congress' "clear intent" that the allotment be nontaxable.
55. Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, 57.
56. 452 F.2d 741 (9th Cir. 1971).
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Act's policy of resisting allotment's "serious diminution of Indian land
base ... which, through the process of intestate succession, had resulted in many Indians holding uneconomical fractional interests of
the original allotments. '57 Reluctant to rely on economic policy alone
to support its holding, however, the court fictionalized Bureau of Indian Affairs approval of allottee's land purchases into purchases of
land for allottees by the United States, which are statutorily tax-exempt.5 8 Both the policy and this fiction should have been applicable
equally to allottees' purchases of other Indians' allotted land, of nonallotted tribal land, and even of non-Indian-owned fee land, but further extension of Stevens seems unlikely. 59
Income tax discrimination against development on nonallotted
tribal land and tax discrimination against reservation commercial development were tested inconclusively in Critzer v. United States. 60
The Indian owner of a prosperous motel on nonallotted tribal land
sought reimbursement of business income taxes. Evidently sympathetic,6 1 the trial division of the Court of Claims concluded that the
motel income should have been exempt. Two different reasons were
given, one of them applicable only to Critzer's North Carolina
Cherokee reservation. Entirely adequate to dispose of the case, the
narrow ruling involved the specific language of the 1924 act extending the allotment policy to the Eastern Band of Cherokees. 62
The trial division of the Court of Claims went on, however, to use
57. Id. at 748.
58. Id. at 747-49. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 335, 465, 747 (1976).
59. Cf. Fry v. United States, 557 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 72
(1978) (in circumstances functionally similar to tribe member's lease or use by permit

of tribal land, tribe member's income from cutting timber on such land is not tax-exempt); Holt v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 38, 41 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
931 (1967) (Indian's ranching income from cattle operations on tribal land used pursuant to grazing permit is taxable).
60. 77-2 U.S. TAx CAS. 9540 (Ct. CI. Trial Div. No. 135-75, July 12, 1977). See
also United States v. Critzer, 498 F.2d 1160 (4th Cir. 1974) (earlier related case, held no
criminal tax liability for nonpayment of taxes here in question).
61. See, e.g., 77-2 U.S. TAX CAS.
9540 at 87,818: "And so it seems that Mrs.
Critzer became too rich too fast to suit the [tax] gatherer. Had her profits been those of
a humble Indian farmer or cattle grazer, there is little reason to feel that she would have
aroused the Collector's appetite ....
62. Unlike the General Allotment Act which refers only to the status of allotments,
the Cherokee act expressly declares that "all restricted allotments and undivided property shall be exempt from taxation." Act of June 4, 1924, ch. 253, § 21, 43 Star. 376,
381, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (note) (1976) (emphasis added). See Critzer v. United States, 77-2
U.S. TAX CAS. t 9540 at 87,816. Critzer's possessory holdings of tribal land were "undivided property" within the meaning of the act. The language places Eastern Cherokee
squarely within the Internal Revenue Service's category of exemption by the "clear intent" of Congress.
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reasoning applicable to most other reservations. Where tribal assignment of land to an individual Indian "possesses all of [the] significant
attributes" of an allotment, that is, inalienability in fee, it should be
63
tax-exempt, just as an allotment would be.

On policy considerations, the court also rejected the IRS interpretation of income "directly derived" from the land. The court said the
purpose of the tax exemption is to foster Indian economic advancement generally; any productive use of the land is within the scope of
the exemption. 64 " [T] he plaintiff is utilizing to its best advantage the
land that Congress had declared to be exempt. Such utilization clearly
falls within the Congressional intent that Indians improve themselves
economically so that they may take their rightful place in civilized so65
ciety."
Although it exposed the absurdity of subsidizing only primary uses
of Indian land, Critzer's reliance on the unique provisions of the
Cherokee allotment law makes its influence uncertain. It remains to
66
be seen whether it will be followed narrowly or broadly.

63. Critzer v. United States, 77-2 U.S. TAX CAS. 9540 at 87,815- 16. Land on the
North Carolina Cherokee reservation had never been allotted; the allotment policy had
been terminated by the Indian Reorganization Act prior to any allotments. In order to
effect tribe members' individual use of the land, the tribe had created certificates of possessory holding for parcels of tribal land which gave tribe members use of the parcel to
the same extent as an allotment, except that title always remained in the United States
in trust for the tribe and the tribe had certain supervisory powers. Id. at 87,813-14. A
tribal assignment by way of such possessory holding may be distinguished from more
temporary leases or permits. See cases cited at note 59 supra.
64. Critzer v. United States, 77-2 U.S. TAX CAS. 9540 at 87,817. The court also
declared:
Congress scarcely intended the tax exemption to be an incentive to the Indians to
use their lands in the most primitive ways possible, so that the income derived
therefrom would be "derived directly" from "raw land" and therefore tax exempt.
The exemption was not granted by Congress in order to foster economic backwardness among the Indians.
Id.
The "derived directly" requirement was to distinguish income derived from use of the
land from reinvestment income, not to distinguish among uses of the land. Id. Thus,
business income from Critzer's motel and restaurant is tax-exempt, but if such income
is put in a bank account or invested in stocks, any interest, dividends, or gains on sale of
stock are taxable as reinvestment income.
65. Id. Critzer's land was unsuitable for farming, ranching, or timber production.
Id. at 87,814. Under the circumstances, a motel represented the "highest, best, and only
use" of Critzer's land assignment. Id. at 87,814. See also id. at 87,817-18.
66. Critzer has not resulted in any official clarification of Revenue Ruling 67-284.
The Supreme Court declined the opportunity to review its theory in other cases, e.g.,
Fry v. United States, 557 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 72 (1978); Holt
v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 931 (1967).
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B.

Taxation of the Tribe and Tribal Instrumentalities

According to Revenue Ruling 67-284 the tribe itself is exempt
from income taxation. 67 Although salutory, there is no express statutory basis for this position. The Internal Revenue Code exempts the
income of United States possessions, 68 the income of a state or its subdivisions derived from a public utility or an essential governmental
function, 69 and the income of federal corporations expressly made
tax-exempt by their act of incorporation.7 0 Tribes are functionally analogous to state and territorial governments, and many tribes are incorporated under the Indian Reorganization Act,7 1 but no tribe precisely fits the statutory conditions of tax exemption. Nevertheless, the
tax exemption of tribes is well established.
Federal tax treatment of tribes generally is similar to the treatment
of other subfederal governments, but in certain instances it is more
restrictive. The IRS considers interest on tribal revenue bonds taxable
because there is no express statutory exemption of tribal bond interest.7 2 It seems strange that the tribe's bonds are taxable for lack of express statutory language when the tribe itself is exempt by analogy at
best. It is stranger still because it should be in the United States' own
financial interest to exempt tribal bond interest from income taxation,
since tribes are more dependent on federal financial support when
they cannot compete with tax-exempt state and municipal bonds in
73
private capital markets.
Unlike other subfederal governments, tribes commonly engage in a
variety of for-profit business enterprises. Are tribal enterprise profits
taxable? The statutory test applicable to states and municipalities distinguishes between essential governmental functions and proprietary
activities,7 4 but this analysis is difficult to extend to tribes. States generally finance services out of taxes and borrowing and have little need
67. Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, 58.
68. I.R.C. § 115(2).
69. Id. § 115(1).
70. Id. §501(c)(1).
71. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1976).
72. Rev. Rul. 68-231, 1968-1 C.B. 48.
73. Representatives Ullman and Udall unsuccessfully sponsored a bill in 1977 to
equalize tribal and state status with regard to bond interest as well as public scholarships, political contributions, and employer contributions to retirement plans. H.R.
4089, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977).
74. For states and municipalities, income is exempt only when derived from a public utility or an essential government function. I.R.C. § 115(1). For United States possessions, however, there is no such restriction on exempt income. Id. § 115(2). It is unclear which rule would be applied to tribes.
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to turn to "private" enterprises. Economically depressed, with little
tax base and at a competitive disadvantage in public bond markets,
tribes, however, have little alternative for public finance.7 5 Tribes often raise revenue for public works, social services, education, and
transfer payments by operating businesses. Tribal revenue may be
taxable simply because it is raised by means different than those of
other subfederal governments. Tracing the use of revenue rather than
its source would seem to be a better approach.
Whether or not tribal revenue is taxable in tribal hands, it is taxable when paid by the tribe to its officers or employees as compensation,76 or when paid by the tribe to its members as a distribution or income supplement. 77 Federal and state transfer payments to
individuals are ordinarily tax-exempt on the sensible theory that it
would be futile to tax back what was purposely given. And most federal payments to individual Indians such as land claims judgment distributions are also statutorily tax-exempt.78 Nevertheless, Revenue
Ruling 67-284 classifies tribal "per capita" payments to tribal members as taxable income.7 9 Administratively, per capitas are equal dividends out of the tribe's budget surplus. Because reservation incomes
vary little and tend to fall below the poverty level, however, a system
of need-adjusted payments would differ very little from equal payments. Calling tribal payments "welfare" and making them ostensibly
need-adjusted in order to win them exempt status would simply
involve wasteful administrative cost. 80
C.

Taxability of Treaty Rights

An interesting byproduct issue of the recent controversy over treaty
hunting and fishing rights is the taxability of income from the exercise
of those rights. If an activity is protected from federal and state inter75. See generally Barsh & Henderson, Tribal Administration of Natural Resource
Development, 52 N.D.L. REv. 307 (1975).
76. Commissioner v. Walker, 326 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1964); Rev. Rul. 67-284,
1967-2 C.B. 55, 58; Rev. Rul. 59-354, 1959-2 C.B. 24.
77. Choteau v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 691, 697 (1931); Rev. Rul. 67-284, 19672 C.B. 55, 58.
78. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 1407 (1976) (Indian Claims Commission judgments); Rev.
Rul. 77-77, 1977- 1 C.B. II (nonreimbursable grants under Indian Financing Act of
1974).
79. Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, 58.
80. Fear that tribes could immunize their members from income taxes by taking a
paper interest in all reservation businesses and paying everyone per capitas is misplaced, at least as long as reservation incomes are so low that welfare is necessary.
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ference by a treaty, how can it be taxed without a modification of the
treaty or an act of Congress clearly expressing an intention to disre81
gard the agreement?
The only consideration of this problem antedates all of the recent
litigation in the Northwest. In CharlesStrom82 the Tax Court in 1946
held that income from a Quinault Indian's fishing pursuant to the
Quinault Treaty is taxable by the United States. The Tax Court
agreed that the treaty guaranteed protection of the tribe's right to fish
but said that the "disputed income tax is not a burden upon the right
to fish, but upon the income earned through the exercise of that
right." 8 3 A ten per cent cutback in fishing days presumably would be
a prohibited burden, but a ten per cent tax on the fishermen's income
would not be a burden. 84 Nothing could be a more perfect fiction, for
the "right to fish" is meaningless unless it comprehends the value of its
exercise. For the owner of the right, it is irrelevant whether we tax it
or restrict its exercise; in either case the net value of having it is diminished. It does not matter whether we halve the number of fish
caught, or tax away half of their value to the fisherman. The burden
of a tax on the output of capital is borne by owners.
Reasoning like Strom's was proposed by the Internal Revenue Service but rejected by the Supreme Court in Capoeman.85 If the income
"directly derived" from an allotment is as exempt as the land itself,
the income "directly derived" from a treaty right also must be as exempt from taxation or interference as the treaty right itself. Increased
commercial exercise of treaty fishing rights in the Pacific Northwest
in the past four years undoubtedly will trigger relitigation of this issue.
D.

Special Federal Taxes on Tribal Property

The "directly derived from allotments" test of Revenue Ruling 67284 limits federal income tax exemptions to only about one-fifth of all
81. The traditional canon of construction for Indian treaties and legislation would
seem appropriately applied here. "Doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of
the weak and defenseless people who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its
protection and good faith." Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930).
82. Charles Strom, 6 T.C. 621 (1946), affd per curiam, 158 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.

1947).
83. Id. at 627 (emphasis in original). But see Mason v. Sams, 5 F.2d 255 (W.D.
Wash. 1925).

84. "It is undoubtedly true that the Federal Government is not empowered to lay a
tax upon the exercise of the right of the petitioners [Quinault Indians] to fish in the waters of this reservation." Charles Strom, 6 T.C. at 628. The court gave no explanation
for the very fine distinction thus made.
85. 351 U.S. at 6 (quoting IRS brief).
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reservation land and to roughly one-tenth of all reservation Indian income-earners. 86 It is difficult to see why Indians' federal "trustee" is
concerned about Indian taxpaying at all, however. With a median
family income of only $4,008 at the last census, reservation Indians
do not represent a significant tax base. Even if fully taxed, reservation
Indians would not add more than .01% to national personal income
tax collections. 87 This negligible potential yield scarcely seems worth
the risk of prolonging tribal poverty. It is therefore remarkable that
federal law imposes additional taxes on Indians not levied on other
citizens. 88 The most pernicious is the "administrative fee" authorizing
the Secretary of the Interior "to collect reasonable fees to cover the
cost of any and all work performed for Indian tribes or for individual
Indians, to be paid by vendees, lessees, assignees, or deducted from
the proceeds of sale, leases, or other sources of revenue." 89 Collections are deposited to the Bureau of Indian Affairs' account in the
Treasury under the euphemism, "Indian Moneys, Proceeds of Labor"
or IMPL, where they are available for disposal by the agency for its
own uses without additional budgetary authorization. 90
The discretionary nature of this tax91 has resulted in a variety of inconsistent applications. Bureau regulations currently provide for a
10% tax on the "gross amount received for timber sold" from individual and tribal trust lands, or 5% where "little administrative expense... is required"; 92 for a tax of 3% on the first $500, 2% on the
86.

S.

AMERICANS

LEVITAN & W.

17-19 (1975).

JOHNSTON, INDIAN GIVING:

FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR NATIVE

See generally ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION,

U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL AND STATE INDIAN RESERVATIONS (1974);
OF THE CENSUS,

1970

CENSUS OF POPULATION: SUBJECT REPORT:

BUREAU

AMERICAN INDIANS

(1973).
87. Computed from data in sources cited in note 86 and 1977 federal income tax
schedules. Maximum tax payable by Indian families in each income bracket reported in
the census was computed, totaled, and then compared with total federal personal income tax collections.
88. "Tax" is used here in the broad sense of any cost added to activities by public
action. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
89. 25 U.S.C. § 413 (1976).
90. The government's position is summarized in two recent documents. Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs to Area Directors (August 16.
1978) ("Bureau Policy on the Expenditure of Indian Money, Proceeds of Labor Funds")
(copy on file with Washington Law Review); Memorandum from Assistant SecretaryIndian Affairs to Area Director, Portland, Ore. (July 17, 1978) ("Use of IMPL Funds")
(copy on file with Washington Law Review).
91. The Secretary collects the fees "in his discretion, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe." 25 U.S.C. § 413 (1976).
92. 25 C.F.R. § 141.18 (1978). Choctaw Nation v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 320,
369 (1940), in a related context, construed the word "proceeds" in the statute to mean
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next $4500, and 1% on the next $5000 of the gross rental in any
lease of individual or tribal trust land for grazing or other purposes,
with a maximum tax of $250; 93 and for simple $10 fees on mining
leases and sales.9 4 In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976, $34 million or 31% of all proceeds of natural resource exploitation on tribal
land in the United States was subject to the 10% gross tax, and the
Bureau deposited $3.7 million to its IMPL account. 9 5 Thus, Indians,
who are the objects of an involuntary "trust" imposed on them by law
for their "protection," have to pay for its administration. But there is
no evidence that this special tax-supported involuntary management
process adds significantly to the resource management abilities of an
Indian reservation. On the contrary, federal management may actually misdirect and reduce the net value of transactions in Indian re96
sources.
Although the Bureau by regulation presently limits its "fee" on
mineral exploitation to $10, 9 7 federal law also empowers the states to
tax production of "oil and gas and other minerals" on unallotted tribal lands.98 The states lack any other power to regulate or supervise
tribal mineral development, however. 9 9 The net effect is that state
taxes on state and tribal mining operations return state benefits only

gross revenue less cost of sale. Apparently the Bureau does not follow this interpretation.
93.
94.

25 C.F.R. § 131.13(b)(1) (general leasing), 151.22 (grazing permits) (1978).
Id. § 171.25, 172.31 (1978).

95. This IMPL deposit represents an amount equal to about 4% of the Bureau's total annual budget for resource management and administration and 13% of its budget
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF
APPENDIX 748 (1976); DEP'T OF THE TREATHE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT -1977
SURY, COMBINED STATEMENT OF RECEIPTS, EXPENDITURES AND BALANCES OF THE UNITED

for forestry operations alone.

STATES GOVERNMENT (for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1976) at 100 (accounts 148500.3 (new IMPL deposits) and 14-8500.2 (interest)) [hereinafter cited as COMBINED
STATEMENT]. Per dollar of gross resources income, it costs the Bureau of Indian Affairs
about seven times more to manage timber than to supervise mining, but this is far
smaller than the difference between the effective rates of the "administrative fee" on
these two activities. For example, on the sale of $1 million in timber the fee is either
$50,000 or $100,000, while on a sale of $1 million of coal or oil the fee is $10, or at most

115000 as much.
96. See Barsh & Henderson, supra note 75, at 309-15. See also Trosper, American
Indian Relative Ranching Efficiency, 68 AM. ECON. REv. 503 (1978). See generally

1.
25 C.F.R. § 171.25 (1978). See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
25 U.S.C. § 398 (1976).
The one case directly testing state power to pool and unitize reservation oil
was dismissed for technical flaws in the pleadings. Yoder v. Assiniboine & Sioux

STAFF OF AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, supranote

97.
98.
99.
leases
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to state operators. This redistribution of income is of considerable
proportions. Mineral resources account for a little over half of all
tribal trust land revenues.' 00
Federal law therefore subjects tribal economies to two special
taxes, Bureau "fees" and state mineral taxes, in addition to most general federal income taxes. Both special taxes are levied on the primary
value of most reservation land: natural resource exploitation. The
combined effect of special taxes and general federal taxes may subject
economic activity on reservations to a higher aggregate tax burden
than identical off-reservation activities. 101 National data on personal
Indian incomes indicates that tribal land development revenues account for almost 25% of all reservation Indian income, individual
and tribal. 102 Tribal resources are typically owned and exploited by
tribal enterprises and nearly half of all reservation Indian employment is in the public sector. The rate of growth in and the profitability
of natural resource development is therefore especially crucial to Indian welfare, and the collection of special taxes on development is
counter-productive.

IV.

STATE TAXATION

Although more in the public eye in recent years than federal taxation of Indians and Indian resources, state taxation shares problems
of legislative silence and inconsistent judicial interpretations. The case

Tribes, 339 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1964). Cases involving reservation enforcement of state
zoning codes and fisheries management programs make state power to regulate reservation resource exploitation highly questionable. See, e.g., Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n.
v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 277
(1978) (fisheries); United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 341 (W.D. Wash.
1974), affd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976) (fisheries);
Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 70 Wn. 2d 668, 425 P.2d 22 (1967) (zoning).
100. See COMBINED STATEMENT, supra note 95, at 99-100 (account 14-8365 (trust
receipts)). See also H. HOUGH, DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN RESOURCES 115-40 (1967) (surveying mineral revenues of tribes).
101. In addition to this extra tax burden, the chilling effect of Bureau of Indian Affairs "white tape," applicable only to transactions with tribes and tribal members,
makes it easier to understand the persistent reluctance of business to invest in or finance
reservation development. See Barsh & Henderson, supra note 75, at 314-27; Barsh,
Corporationsand Indians: Who's the Villain?, MBA, June 1975, at 11.
102. Computed from data in S. LEVITAN & W. JOHNSTON, supra note 86, at 11-33,
and BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION: SUBJECT REPORT: AMERICAN
INDIANS 151-57 (1973).
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law has been exhaustively analyzed elsewhere, 103 but a synthesis of
major trends and theories will be helpful here. In the development of
federal decisions on state taxation of reservations, there have been
three broad phases, each characterized by a different theory for the
presence or absence of state taxing power.
A.

Phase I: Tribal Sovereignty

In 1832, the Supreme Court ruled in Worcester v. Georgia'0 4 that
states can exercise over tribes only those powers delegated to them by
Congress, and that the United States itself has and can delegate only
105
those powers of tribal self-government ceded to it by the tribes.
Thirty years later, the Supreme Court applied this theory of state
power in The Kansas Indians'0 6 to an attempt by the state of Kansas
to tax individual Indians on the Shawnee reservation. Recognized in
its treaties with the United States as a distinct people with its own government, the Shawnees could not be subject to any federal or state
power without their consent. 07 Finding no evidence that the Shawnees had ceded any inherent taxing or regulatory powers to the United
States by treaty, either in the express language of the treaty or in the
conduct of federal and tribal authorities, the Court concluded that the
tribe retained the sole and exclusive power to tax reservation property. 108 Members of the tribe therefore were completely immune from
state taxation.
103. See, e.g., J. WHITE, TAXING THOSE THEY FOUND HERE (1972); Barsh, The
Omen: Three Affiliated Tribes v. Moe and the Future of Tribal Self-Government, 5
AM. INDIAN L. REV. I (1977); Comment, State Taxation of Indians-FederalPreemption of Taxation Against the Backdrop of Tribal Sovereignty, 49 WASH. L. REV. 191
(1975).
104. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
105. Id. at 557-61. The Court stated:

The treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory as
completely separated from that of the States; and provide that all intercourse with

them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the Union.
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory,
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent of
the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress.
Id.
106.
(1867).

107.
108.

Blue Jacket v. Board of Comm'rs (The Kansas Indians), 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737

Id. at 755-57.
Id. at 755-56.
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Exclusive tribal tax jurisdiction was not long-lived. In The
Cherokee Tobacco, 0 9 heard only three years after The Kansas Indians, the applicable treaty expressly exempted from federal taxes

goods made and sold within the Indian Territory. The Supreme Court
nevertheless upheld federal taxation of tobacco made and sold within

the Indian Territory, reasoning that congressional breach of a treaty
stipulation involves a nonjusticiable, political question.11 0 The net effect of The Kansas Indians and The Cherokee Tobacco was to permit

federal, but not state, infringements of tribes' independent tax jurisdiction.
B.

Phase II: Federal Instrumentalities

In the United States, local revenue has always rested on a foundation of property taxes. Formal legal division of tribal territory into
individual holdings under the General Allotment Act' I I after 1887 re-

sulted in a flurry of property tax controversies. Putting Indians on a
footing of complete socioeconomic individualism, allotment officially
abolished tribal governments; the Supreme Court could no longer jus-

tify exemption from state taxation on the basis of tribal sovereignty.
The Court was nevertheless persuaded that state taxation of allotments would impoverish Indians struggling to make a start in
agriculture and lead to tax foreclosures of allotted lands. In United
States v. Rickert, 1 2 the Court concluded that "[t]o tax [allotted]

lands is to tax an instrumentality employed by the United States for
the benefit and control of this dependent race, and to accomplish beneficent objects . . . [I] f they may be taxed, then the obligations
which the government has assumed in reference to these Indians may
be entirely defeated." 113 Rickert extended the exemption to the land

109. Two Hundred and Seven Half Pound Papers of Smoking Tobacco v. United
States (The Cherokee Tobacco), 78 U.S. ( 11 Wall.) 616 (1871).
110. Id. at 621. Justice Davis, who wrote the opinion in The Kansas Indians, joined
the dissent in The Cherokee Tobacco and would have held the federal tax inapplicable
on the Indian territory. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 622-24 (Bradley
and Davis, JJ., dissenting).
111. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C §§
331-381 (1976)).
112. 188 U.S. 432 (1903).
113. Id. at 437-38. See also id. at 438-39. The Rickert Court identified two other
sufficient grounds for the tax exemption: the language of the allotment act itself, id. at
438, and an express disclaimer of jurisdiction over Indian lands in the state's constitution, id. at 440-41. Subsequent decisions relied on Rickert's instrumentality language
alone, however. The relevant portion of the General Allotment Act provides that "at the
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itself, permanent improvements, and personal property supplied or financed by the United States.' 1 4 The extent of the instrumentality entitled to tax exemption was subject to interpretation in later cases.
Although it upheld Indian tax immunity in the case before it, the
Rickert Court altered the complexion of reservation tax litigation by
implying that state jurisdiction is to be presumed absent explicit federal policy to the contrary. Such a presumption was consistent with
the Court's belief that allotment was part of a transition to full state
control of formerly tribal areas." 5 Since the general object of federal
policy was to assimilate Indians into state government, it seemed reasonable not to delay that process without some clear indication of fed6
eral intent."
Subsequent decisions at first broadened the range of activities on
Indian land which qualified for instrumentality tax exemptions. In
Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf Railroad Co. v. Harrison,"7 the Supreme Court agreed that a non-Indian mineral lessee acted as a federal instrumentality in developing Indian trust lands. Any tax on the
value of the lessee's business or otherwise affecting the ability of the
lessee to engage in it successfully would be invalid. The Court, moreover, warned states against trying to avoid its ruling by inventing new
taxes or giving them new names. "Neither state courts nor legislatures,
by giving a tax a particular name, or by the use of some form of
words, can take away our duty to consider its real nature and effect.""11 8 Choctaw and the cases that followed it struck down Oklahoma state taxes on lessees' gross production (both in ad valorem and

expiration of said period the United States will convey the same by patent to said Indian, or his heirs as aforesaid, in fee, discharged of said trust and free of all charge or
incumbrance whatsoever...." 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1976) (emphasis added).

114.

188 U.S. at 442 (permanent improvements such as houses and other structures

on allotted lands), 443-44 (personal property-cattle, horses, and other property-is-

sued to Indians in connection with allotment).
115.
116.

See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 246 (1896).
The allotment policy was repudiated by the Indian Reorganization Act in

1934, however. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-465 (1976). The act re-established reservation boundaries and tribal governing bodies, inconsistent with any presumed state regulatory authority. It should have put an end to Rickert, and resurrected pre-Rickert theories of tribal sovereignty. But the course of the law was to pay more heed to the economics of oil

than to the words of Congress or of treaties. Mineral production from non-Indian
leaseholds on Indian lands was a magnetic attraction to state tax administrators in the
era of the great Oklahoma oil strikes. For 50 years following Rickert nearly all reservation tax cases involved non-Indian lessees; in none was an Indian or Indian tribe directly represented.
117.
118.

235 U.S. 292 (1914).
Id.at298.
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excise form), property, and income. 119 In Gillespie v. Oklahoma,120
Justice Holmes expressed the instrumentality principle succinctly: no
tax is valid if it is "a direct hamper upon the effort of the United
States to make the best terms that it can for its wards."'' In other
words, any tax shifted to the Indian allottees is invalid.
Rickert, Choctaw and Gillespie narrowly identified the express language and legislative history of the General Allotment Act as the
source of Indians' instrumentality tax exemption. Economic analysis
was used merely to determine the scope of the exemption in a particular case. In Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 2 2 however, the
Supreme Court misconstrued the basis of Indians' immunity. Mountain Producers had nothing to do with Indians and involved federal
taxation of a state instrumentality rather than state taxation of a federal instrumentality. 123 A lessee of Wyoming state school lands
resisted federal taxation on a theory of general intergovernmental tax
immunity absent explicit federal protective legislation. Erroneously
reading Gillespie in support of the lessee's theory, the Supreme Court
declared Gillespie overruled and held that a tax is not invalid merely
because it imposes a "remote" or "theoretical" economic burden on
government. 24 The Court subsequently used Mountain Producers to
strike down the general immunity of federal contractors from state
1 25
taxation.

119. Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922); Large Oil Co. v. Howard, 248
U.S. 549 (1918) (per curiam); Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co., 247 U.S. 503 (1917) (three
cases, per curiam); Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.S. 522
(1916).
120. 257 U.S. 501 (1922).
121. Id. at 506. The Court in Gillespie also declared that if the principal was immune from tax, any income derived from that principal was immune. Id. at 505-06.
122. 303 U.S. 376 (1938). When the Court heard Mountain Producers in 1938, it
was imbued with New Deal concern for "the expanding needs of state and nation" and
anxious to dispose of any remaining vestiges of general intergovernmental tax immunities. See id. at 384.
123. Id. at 383. The alleged instrumentality was a tract of Wyoming state-owned
land, the revenue of which was dedicated to financing the state schools. Although in
Mountain Producers there was no evidence of congressional intent to grant tax immunity and, indeed, the case did not even involve Indian property, the Court overruled
Gillespie. Id. at 387.
124. 303 U.S. at 384, 385-86. See note 121 and accompanying text supra.
125. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1, 8 (1941). A state or local tax exacted
from the federal contractor is not invalid "merely because it is passed on economically,
by the terms of the contract or otherwise, as a part of the construction cost to the government." Id. The federal government unsuccessfully argued that the state tax was invalid
because, due to the manner in which it was collected, the legal incidence of the tax was
on the federal government. Id. at 9.
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A decade after Mountain Producers, Oklahoma Tax Commission
v. Texas Co. 12 6 tested Oklahoma's reimposition of the gross oil production tax on Indians' lessees struck down in Choctaw. 2 7 Ignoring
completely the express language of the General Allotment Act relied
on by Rickert,128 the Vinson Court characterized lessees of allotted
Indian land as merely private persons performing services for the federal government, indistinguishable from other government contractors, 1 29 and applied Mountain Producers' general repudiation of intergovernmental tax immunities to the instrumentality theory of
Indian tax exemption. 130 Justice Rutledge, writing for the Court,
characterized the facts in Mountain Producers and Oklahoma Tax
Commission as identical, 13 ' and, following Mountain Producers'burden test, maintained it was unimaginable that such a "small tax"
32
could do any substantial damage to Indian allottees.'
Justice Rutledge contended there was "no possibility that ultimate
liability for the taxes may fall upon the [Indian] owner of the
land." 33 If "burden" is relevant at all, however, the test should be
economic incidence rather than legal liability. A tax on business income tends to be shifted to the owners of factors of production (land,
labor, and capital) in a competitive setting.' 3 4 Some part of the les35
sees' tax, therefore, is borne by Indian lessors.'

126.
127.
128.
129.

336 U.S. 342 (1949).
See notes 117-21 and accompanying text supra.
188 U.S. at 438.
336 U.S. at 350, 353-54.

130.

Id. at 362-65. Quoting Mountain Producers, the Court unceremoniously re-

jected the theories of Gillespie, Choctaw, and, by implication, Rickert. Id. at 360-61,

364. It also expressly overruled all the oil tax cases. Id.at 365.
131. Id.at 363.
132.

Id.at 351.

133. Id. at 353. 'These cases present no question concerning the immunity of the
Indian lands themselves from state taxation. There is no possibility that ultimate liability for the taxes may fall upon the owner of the land." Id. This reasoning, which distinguishes taxing the land itself from taxing income directly derived from the land, was, of

course, repudiated only seven years later in the federal taxation context in Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956). The Court in Oklahoma Tax Commission seems not to have

grasped that if the non-Indian lessees' production is taxed, the Indian lessor will receive
a smaller royalty, analogous to the effect of federal income taxation on royalties. Cf.
Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55, 57 (royalties exempt from federal income taxation).
134. See notes 14-24 and accompanying text supra (discussion of incidence of various forms of taxation).
135.

Justice Rutledge also argued that the state tax in issue would be lawful, even if

it were a burden on Indian lessors, as the quid pro quo for the benefits of state regulation. 336 U.S. at 351. Oklahoma's oil production proration scheme at that time may
have increased both lessees' and lessors' income by limiting price competition among
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However flawed, Oklahoma Tax Commission turned the course of
Indian law. It ended any widespread application of the instrumentality theory for exempting Indian lands from state tax. Moreover,
Justice Rutledge's reliance on the locus of legal liability for payment
of the tax introduced a new factor in evaluating state taxation of Indians. The identity of the legal taxpayer became more determinative
than the actual incidence of the state tax.
C.

Phase III: FederalPreemption and PersonalRights

Contemporary judicial treatment of state taxation of reservation
wealth began in a 1958 consumer debt case, Williams v. Lee. 136 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Black summarized the determinative principle: "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the
question has always been whether the state action infringed on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them." 137 The Court looks first for governing acts of Congress which
may authorize 138 or limit 139 state power. Absent a determination on
that basis, the Court must consider whether state assertions of power
infringe upon tribal self-government, as if there is an implicit general
federal policy of encouraging Indian home rule. 140
In Williams itself, however, Justice Black confused the issue by using the same facts in applying both tests. Express congressional policy
was found in the history of congressional dealings with Indians, in the
terms of the applicable treaties and in a provision of the Navajo-Hopi
Rehabilitation Act expressly authorizing tribal constitutional self-govoil companies. Most state laws' benefits spill over to neighboring jurisdictions, however.
A homeowner in Portland, Oregon, benefits from law enforcement activities in neighboring Washington counties but does not thereby become liable for the payment of
Washington taxes.
136. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). Williams tested state civil jurisdiction over an action
brought by a non-Indian vendor against an Indian purchaser to collect goods sold
on the Indian reservation.
137. Id. at 220.
138. The Court in Williams noted that there was a general statute under which
states were authorized, in appropriate circumstances, to assume jurisdiction over reservation Indians, but that Arizona had not acted under the statute. 358 U.S. at 222-23
(citing Public Law 280, Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 589, §§ 6-7,
reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 1360 notes (1976)). See also id. at 221 n.6.
139. See, e.g., notes 141 & 142 and accompanying text infra.
140. The source to which the Court looked for the right of reservation Indians to
self-government is ambiguous. The Court cited the antecedent tribal sovereignty principle of Worcester v. Georgia and The Kansas Indians. 358 U.S. at 218-20. But the Court
also referred to the conduct of Congress. Id. at 220-22.
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ernment.' 4 ' The intimation was that congressional policy, especially
the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act, had precluded the area of state
jurisdiction over the territory by the tribe, regardless of whether state
action in a particular case actually infringed on tribal authority. 42
But Justice Black also argued that state civil jurisdiction is per se an
actual infringement of tribal self-government. 43 Thus, it was not
clear in Williams whether the Indian petitioners' immunity from state
law was based on preclusive express congressional enactments or on
the actual infringement of an implicit policy. 4 4 Unfortunately, subsequent cases have construed Williams to require both express federal
recognition of tribal jurisdiction and a showing of actual infringement

or harm.
141. The relevant section of the Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act provides in part:
The members of the tribe shall have the right to adopt a tribal constitution ... provid [ing] for the exercise by the Navajo Tribe of any powers vested in the tribe...
by existing law, together with such additional powers as the members of the tribe
may, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, deem proper to include
therein.
25 U.S.C. § 636 (1976). The Indian Reorganization Act contains similar provisions.
"Any Indian tribe... shall have the right to organize for its common welfare, and may
adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws," including "all powers vested in any Indian tribe ... by existing law," subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior. 25
U.S.C. § 476 (1976).
142. For a discussion of the preemption doctrine in Indian law, see D. GETCHES, D.
ROSENFELT & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 295-99 (1979). For discussions of
preemption generally, in non-Indian contexts, see Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435

U.S. 151, 156-57 (1978); Morris, Constitutional Preemption of State Laws Against
Massive Oil Spills, 1 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 73, 83-97 (1977); Note, The Preemption
Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives of Federalismand the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
623 (1975).
143. 358 U.S. at 223. If this is construed as the infringement of a federal policy,
then the conflict variety of preemption is involved. See Morris, supra note 142, at 8485. But it may also be portrayed as infringement of antecedent tribal sovereignty.
144. The most plausible interpretation of Justice Black's reasoning is that express
federal recognition of antecedent general tribal jurisdiction is equivalent to an express
preclusive federal prohibition of state jurisdiction. By recognizing in general terms the
authority of a tribe, Congress preempted all state regulation of tribal territory. Read
this way, Williams finally dealt with the two-decade-old Indian Reorganization Act,
which the Court had not referred to since its enactment. This interpretation draws some
support from Justice Black's handling of Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965). The taxpayer was a non-Indian trader on the Navajo reservation. He argued that the federal statute licensing and regulating Indian traders, 25
U.S.C. §§ 261-262 (1976), completely preempted state regulation and taxation of his
business, and Justice Black, writing for the Court in Warren, agreed. The comprehensive statute and regulations showed "that no room remains for state laws imposing additional burdens upon traders." 380 U.S. at 690. See also id. at 691-92. This was so even
though federal law does not expressly exempt licensed traders from any local laws or
taxes.
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Fifteen years later, the Court had an opportunity to apply Williams
to a tax problem. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission 4 5 involved that state's attempt to tax an individual Navajo's reservation
income. Groping for doctrine, the Court offered four entirely independent theories for its holding that McClanahan's income was tax
exempt. Without offering any specifics, the Court implied that state
income taxation would infringe on Navajo self-government.1 46 But
the Court also made a great deal of the fact that Congress had shown
a clear intent to protect Navajo self-government and had never expressly authorized the Arizona tax-a federal preemption theory. t47
It was not clear whether the tax was illegitimate because it actually
interfered with tribal government or because it was generally
preempted by federal recognition of Navajo tribal government.' 48 Not
yet satisfied, Justice Marshall, for the unanimous Court, observed
that Arizona's Enabling Act 4 9 expressly disclaimed jurisdiction over
Indian land. Thus, even if the state tax were harmless and not
preempted by federal recognition of the tribal constitution, it would
still be void under the law admitting Arizona to the Union.1 50 Last,
but not least, McClanahan was immune from state taxation because
of her personal status as a reservation Indian, apart from the political
authority of her tribe. 15 1 If tax immunity is a personal right, however,
it cannot be lost when the taxpayer leaves the reservation, an implication Justice Marshall neglected to discuss.
The decision and opinion in Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes 5 2 is evidence that McClanahan'spersonal rights analysis
145.

411 U.S. 164(1973).

146. Id. at 174-75. This reasoning, of course, recalls the tribal sovereignty rationale of Worcester v. Georgia and The Kansas Indians. See notes 104-08 and accompanying text supra.
147.

411 U.S. at 176-78.

148. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (per curiam). In Fisher, exclusive tribal jurisdiction over on-reservation child custody disputes solely among tribe
members was justified alternatively on the grounds of infringement of tribal selfgovernment, id. at 388, or of complete federal preemption of state jurisdiction through
enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act, id. at 388-90. The Court seems unable to
separate the two parts of Williams and follow either one or the other consistently.

149. Act ofJune 10, 1910, ch. 310, § 20, 36 Stat. 557, 569-570.
150. 411 U.S. at 175.
151. Id. at 181. This personal immunity argument was a refinement of the tribal
sovereignty and federal preemption arguments. The Court was required to make it because Arizona had argued that since the income tax was a personal tax on individual Indians, not a tax on Indian lands or a tax on Indian business operations, it did not "infringe" on tribal self-government or contravene federal policies protecting tribes. See
id. at 166-67.
152. 425 U.S. 463 (1976). See generally Barsh, supra note 103.
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has captured the Court's imagination. Montana tried to impose its cigarette excise tax on sales by Indian vendors on the reservation to
Indian and non-Indian consumers. A three-judge district court upheld
the imposition of the tax on non-Indian consumers, and the Supreme
Court agreed. 153 According to Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous Court, Montana state law, which defined the consumer purchaser as the legal taxpayer, was conclusive as to the economic incidence of the tax. 1 54 Under state law, the tax was borne by the retail
purchaser; vendors merely "precollected" it by adding it to the sales
price. A tax paid by non-Indians could neither infringe on the personal rights of Indians nor harm the tribe because Indians did not
155
bear the tax.
The actual economic burden of Montana's cigarette tax is not settled so neatly, however. Depending on the price inelasticity of demand for cigarettes, a tax on cigarette sales will be borne in some part
by vendors. 156 Moe permits states to tax Indian businesses indirectly
by taxing their sales to non-Indians. Justice Rehnquist's opinion conceded that Indian vendors probably would lose net income on sales,
but deemed that immaterial. "Since nonpayment of the tax is a
misdemeanor as to the retail purchaser, the competitive advantage
which the Indian seller doing business on tribal land enjoys ...is depurchaser is willing to
pendent on the extent to which the non-Indian
157
tax."'
the
pay
flout his legal obligation to
This is equivalent to saying that it is legal to tax the sale because it
is legal to tax the sale. The question in the case should be whether
Montana may tax non-Indian purchases from Indian sellers. Montana's tax is questionable under federal law because it causes economic loss to the Indian seller just as a tax directly on Indians. It
therefore is circular to disregard the economic loss on the assumption
153.

425 U.S. at 481-83. The Court did hold, however, that the cigarette tax on

sales by Indian vendors to Indian purchasers, a state license fee for vendors, and a personal property tax on property within the reservation were all inapplicable to reserva-

tion Indians. Id. at 480-8 1.
154. Id. at 481-82. The Court thus reversed the position on interpreting state tax
laws and the impact of their burdens which it had expressed in Choctaw. See notes 117 &
118 and accompanying text supra.
155. Just as the burden imposed on Indian sellers by requiring them to collect the

tax "is not, strictly speaking, a tax at all" and hence is permissible, 425 U.S. at 483, so
the net business loss of Indian income due to the imposition of the tax is not "strictly
speaking" a tax. But see note 5 and accompanying text supra (broader definition of
"tax").
156. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra (tax shifting as function of price
elasticity).
157.

425 U.S. at 482 (emphasis in original).
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that Montana legally can impose it on Indians. 158 Under Moe, moreover, the state can use the Indian vendor as an involuntary agent in collecting the tax from non-Indians and make the vendor liable for pre1 59
payment without infringing upon Indians' personal tax immunity.
If the Court's analysis in Moe seems confusing, consider that in
Bryan v. Itasca County,160 decided little more than a month after
Moe by another unanimous Court, Justice Brennan declared that the
proper rule in cases challenging state taxation of Indians had always
been federal preemption. No mention was made of infringement of
tribal self-government, of reservation Indians' personal rights, or of
the identity of the legal taxpayer. The relevant issue, according to
Bryan, was the presence or absence of clear congressional consent to
16
the state tax. '
Bryan may not have been as much of a departure as it seems on
first impression. The court below held that the state lacked power to
1 62
tax Bryan's property absent congressional statutory authorization,
limiting the Supreme Court's freedom to discuss alternative theories
of state power. Furthermore, the facts in Bryan fulfilled both the per163
sonal rights and legal taxpayer standards of McClanahan and Moe
158. Justice Rehnquist may have had in mind non-Indians' obligation to pay a compensating state use tax upon re-entering state territory in possession of untaxed goods.
However, the fact that a state citizen may fail to pay his own state's compensating use
tax upon re-entry has never been sufficient by itself to permit his state of residence to
follow him into the territory of the state of purchase. A state's tax collection procedure
may reach outside of state territory only to businesses that have "some definite link"
with the taxing state. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S.
753, 756-57 (1967) (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45
(1954)). See also National Geographic Soc'y v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S.
551,560-61 (1977).
159. 425 U.S. at 482-83. See note 155 supra.
160. 426 U.S. 373 (1976). Bryan, a tribal Indian residing on the reservation, challenged the power of the county to assess a personal property tax on his mobile home located on reservation trust land. The case would have been resolved simply, perhaps by
reference to Rickert, see notes 114 & 115 and accompanying text supra, but for the fact
that Minnesota had assumed civil and criminal jurisdiction over Bryan's reservation in
accordance with Public Law 280. 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976). See generally Comment, Washington's Public Law 280 JurisdictionOn Indian Reservations, 53
WASH. L. REv. 701 (1978). Public Law 280 required some states, and authorized others,
to assume general civil and criminal trial jurisdiction over tribal areas. In Bryan
Minnesota argued that this included congressional authorization of state taxation in tribal areas, but the Court vigorously denied that interpretation of the statute. 426 U.S. at
381-93.
161. 426 U.S. at 376-77, 376 n.2.
162. Id. at 378.
163. The legal taxpayer in Bryan was a reservation Indian; the tax was levied
against property owned by a reservation Indian and located on the reservation. Id. at
375.
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even though the Court did not discuss them. The Bryan Court did discuss federal preemption as if it were applicable in all Indian tax cases,
although it might have led to a different result in Moe. Consequently,
it is sill not clear what the Supreme Court's standards in state-Indian
tax cases will be in the future.
Nevertheless, it is possible to suggest a general model that incorporates all of the recent decisions without inconsistency. Figure 3 is the
most parsimonious decision tree that predicts all Supreme Court
results since Oklahoma Tax Commission. The identity of the legal
taxpayer seems to be the principal criterion, followed in importance
by the location of the taxed incident.
FIGURE 3
A GENERALIZATION OF STATE TAXATION AFTER MOE

IDENTITY OF THE TAXED WEALTH
TRUST REALTY and
FIXTURES

PERSONALTY, including
LEASEHOLDS a SALES

exempta

LOCUS OF THE TAXED WEALTH

j

OFF-RES1RVATION

ON-RESERVATION

taxableb

IDENTITY OF THE LEGAL TAXPAYER
INDIAN or

LICENSED TADER
exemptc

OTHER

I
taxabled

a. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). See also Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
b. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
c. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (Indian); McClanahan v. Arizona

Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (Indian); Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax
Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) (licensed trader).
d.

Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
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Future Developments: A New Doctrine of Tribal Preemption?

In Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Wash-

ington,164 a three-judge district court held that Washington's cigarette
excise tax could not be applied to Indian vendors' reservation sales to
non-Indians, 165 despite the contrary result apparently required by
Moe. Reading state laws and decisions, the court agreed with Wash-

166
ington that purchasers bear the legal incidence of the cigarette tax.
Standing by itself, then, the state tax would have been valid under

Moe as applied to non-Indian purchasers. In fact, however, it was be-

ing levied in addition to tribal taxes.' 6 7 The court concluded that under such circumstances state taxation had been preempted by the enactment of tribal tax ordinances and caused actual interference with
tribal self-government. 168 Recognition of the authority of tribal
legislation suggests a new, preemption version of the tribal soy-

164. 446 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D. Wash. 1978) (three-judge court), appeal docketed,
No. 76-630 (S. Ct. Oct. 13, 1978), consideration ofjurisdiction postponed to hearing on
nerits, 99 S. Ct. 1210 (1979).
165. 446 F. Supp. at 1362. But see Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,
574 F.2d 1007 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 452 (1978). In Ute the tribe sought to
have Utah's state sales tax declared inapplicable to all sales by tribal vendors on the reservation and to have taxes previously paid refunded. The Tenth Circuit, following Moe,
held that sales to non-Indians were subject to the tax, basing its holding on the legal incidence of the tax under Utah law. Id. at 1009. See also Department of Revenue v. Hane
Constr. Co., 115 Ariz. 243, 564 P.2d 932 (Ariz. App. 1977). Hane upheld the application of Arizona's transaction privilege tax to an out-of-state, non-Indian construction
contractor doing work for the Bureau of Indian Affairs on the Colorado River Reservation. The court observed that federal regulations dealing with government contractors
did not forbid the state tax. The court also noted that tribal self-government was not affected, because the contract was with the Bureau, not the tribe, and no tribal funds were
involved. Id. at 934. Finally, the tax was not on Indian income, property, or lands, because under Arizona law the tax is on "the contractor and cannot legally be shifted to
anyone else." Id. at 934. Even if the tax could be shifted, it would be shifted to the
Bureau and federal government, and only remotely to the Indian tribe. Id. The court
also supported this analysis by noting that in the case Hane in fact had borne the economic burden, absorbed the loss and not passed it on to the government. Id. According
to the agreed facts, however, Hane appears to have computed its bid under the assumption that its reservation activities would be tax-exempt and was only advised by state
authorities to pay the tax after its contract had been executed. See id. at 933.
166. 446 F. Supp. at 1352-55.
167. Id. at 1347, 1369.
168. Id. at 1360-62 (preemption), 1362-64 (tribal self-government). One judge
dissented on the cigarette tax issue and would have held the tax on cigarette sales to nonIndians valid under Moe despite the majority's reliance on tribal tax measures. Id. at
1374-75 (Kilkenny, J., concurring and dissenting).
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ereignty doctrine of earlier days. 169 The Supreme Court has agreed to
hear Colville;17 0 some reconciliation with Moe should be forthcoming.
Essential to the court's reasoning in Colville was its determination
that tribal tax revenues would be reduced substantially if the state tax
was upheld. 17 1 "[W] ith regard to a commodity as highly price elastic
as cigarettes, the result [of the added state tax] will be the depletion
of an already limited tax base.' 7 2 Actual loss of tribal tax revenue

169. See notes 106-10 and accompanying text supra. The court, moreover, made a
great effort to explain the Williams test and to minimize the impact of Mountain Producers. 446 F. Supp. at 1362-63. See notes 136-44 and accompanying text supra (Williams), notes 122-26 and accompanying text supra (Mountain Producers).
170. 99 S. Ct. 1210 (1979).
171. In its preemption reasoning, the court determined that the tribal cigarette marketing, regulating, and taxing ordinance was a valid exercise of its congressionallydelegated power, that the tribal measures and state tax covered the same subject matter,
and, most important, that the state tax would be an obstacle to the accomplishment of
the purpose of the tribal ordinance. 446 F. Supp. at 1360-61. The tribe's purpose was to
raise revenues to fund various essential tribal governmental programs; the state tax
would frustrate that purpose by severely lowering tribal revenues. Id. at 1361-62. Similarly, in its tribal self-government reasoning, the court relied on the economic impact of
state tax. Reductions in tribal tax revenues would lead to curtailment of tribal governmental programs, thus, there was interference with the tribe's self-government. Id. at
1362-63.
Colville described as "delegated" rather than retained all tribal powers not taken
away by Congress, treating the delegation itself as insufficient to preempt state power.
Id. at 1361. However, in Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976), the Supreme Court suggested that the Indian Reorganization Act had generally preempted
state power over subjects included in tribal constitutions.
172. 446 F. Supp. at 1362. The court earlier discussed price elasticity of demand.
Id. at 1347 n.5. If the quoted statement is true, double taxation must reduce individual
Indian vendors' incomes.
Another approach to the problem of distinguishing between legal and economic tax
incidence was taken by the Ninth Circuit in Fort Mojave Tribe v. San Bernardino
County, 543 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1976). The tribe sought relief from a California possessory interest tax on non-Indian lessees of tribal land. The lease rental was a source of
tribal revenue. At first, the court recognized the possibility of tax shifting by non-Indian
lessees to the tribal lessor:
The economic, as opposed to the legal incidence of the tax is uncertain.... In this
case, we proceed on the assumption that it is possible for the economic burden of
the tax, in whole or in part, to fall on the Indians. We do not know whether it is
probable that it will do so.
Id. at 1255 n.2 (emphasis in original). Rather than place the burden of resolving the uncertainty over tax shifting on one of the parties, the court proceeded to dismiss the economic impact of the state tax on Indians as "indirect" and "minimal" for infringement
purposes. Id. at 1258. The court also deemed the tax burden on Indians to be too small
to be invalid absent express congressional authorization, as would be required by
McClanahan and Moe. "The maxim [that ambiguous statutes should be construed to
benefit Indians] was never intended to authorize constructions which, on their face,
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should not have been necessary to support the decision. The tribes
have a governmental interest in regulating reservation businesses operated by tribal members,1 73 whether or not they choose to tax them
for revenue or for other governmental purposes. It should be sufficient for preemption that the tribe has a business regulation ordinance
occupying the field. All vendors in Colville were tribally licensed and
174
regulated.
Unfortunately, the Colville opinion makes it clear that a tribe can
protect reservation business from state taxation only by imposing a
tax system itself.' 75 Tribes can easily enact business taxes and thereby
preempt state tax jurisdiction. But any tax collection scheme involves
administrative expenses; to oust a state tax, the tribe must bear that
expense. Moreovcer, Colville emphasized the tribal government programs funded with tax revenues. If tribal revenues and expenditures,
rather than the existence of a tribal tax ordinance, are the key determinants of preemption, then Colville may rule out tribal schemes to
stimulate business enterprise through the use of tax shelters.
The Colville court was cognizant of the plaintiff tribes' poverty and
underdevelopment and obviously was concerned about the effect of
state taxation on the tribes' ability to raise public funds. Nevertheless,
its decision may deny tribes one of their only tools of economic stimulus. Capital-poor, thinly populated, and short on transportation and
communications infrastructure, tribes can do little to attract new business ventures other than to create local regulatory and tax advantages.
In this sense Colville is an incomplete victory for tribes even if its reasoning is sustained by the Supreme Court.

benefit non-Indians handsomely and Indians only marginally, if at all." Id. at 1257. The
court assumed, without measurement, that little state tax actually would be shifted to
lessors.
Fort Mojave resolved all doubt over tax shifting against the tribe. The court explained this as required by the "state's recognized authority to regulate its citizens." Id.
The Fort Mojave reservation lies at the conjunction of Arizona, California and Nevada,
and there was no evidence that the taxed lessees were all or mostly Californians. In effect, then, California claimed and won the power to tax all non-Indian lessees of Fort
Mojave land within California's boundaries.
173. Cf. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (tribal interest in adjudicating reservation consumer debt cases); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (tribal interest in sole jurisdiction of adoption proceedings involving tribal members).
174. 446 F. Supp. at 1347-48.
175. "[T] here is no preeemption absent tribal taxation." Id. at 1362. See also id. at
1364 (distinguishing Moe by saying that the tribe in Moe received no direct benefit from
reservation cigarette sales because it did not tax them nor was it otherwise directly involved).
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V.
A.

ALTERNATIVES FOR STATE AND TRIBAL TAX
DISPUTES
Continued Litigation

Continued reservation economic growth, increasing state and local
revenue needs, and case law ambiguity make relitigation of the issues
in Moe and Colville likely. States will probably try to protect their
revenue by changing the identity of the legal taxpayer and tribes will
probably respond by legislating more "preemptive" tribal taxes. If
Colville becomes established law, both the legal incidence and the actual direct effect on tribal revenue of each state tax will be fresh issues
in each suit. Moreover, Colville itself leaves many questions, includ76
ing the tax status of Indians not members of the reservation tribe,'
the extent of permissible state record-keeping and collection procedures, l7 7 and burden of proof requirements in contested tax
176. Washington's "Rule 192" was one target of the Colville suit, but many of the
rule's theories survived the decision. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-20-192 (1977)
(adopted November 1976, shortly after Moe). For example, for tax liability purposes it
defines "Indian" as a person "duly registered on the tribal rolls of the Indian tribe upon
and within whose Indian reservation [the] transaction or activity occurs." Id. According to this, if a Flathead is living with his Suquamish wife on the Port Madison reservation with her relatives, she is exempt but he is not. The enforcement of this condition
would reduce the number of reservation Indians entitled to exemptions, but it also
would have the effect of taxing intertribal marriages. Moe had reserved decision on
these problems. 425 U.S. at 480-81 n. 16.
Because the Colville court held that the state cigarette tax was inapplicable to reservation sales to all nontribal members, Indian or not, it did not reach the issue of the definition of Indian for the cigarette tax. For applications of the general sales tax in the connected case, however, it did reach the issue and held that "all Indians residing on a
reservation are equally free from the State's excise taxation regardless of whether they
are members of the tribe." 446 F. Supp. at 1371-72.
177. In the context of cigarette sales to exempt Indian purchasers, Colville concluded that Rule 192's procedures for collecting sales taxes from vendors were unlawfully burdensome, but did not indicate whether any other state collection procedures
might be permissible. 446 F. Supp. at 1359. Washington required precollection of state
sales taxes from all but persons "personally known to the retailer" as enrolled tribal
members and persons bearing official tribal indentity cards. Each exempt sale was to be
documented with a record of the purchaser's name, tribal affiliation, and date. The Colville court correctly reasoned that the required recordkeeping on tax-exempt sales imposed business costs on vendors which they could avoid only by ceasing to do business
with both Indians and non-Indians or minimize by collecting the state tax on all sales.
Id. (ceasing to do business).
Later, however, in the general sales tax context, the court said that precollection and
recordkeeping on taxable transactions were permissible as reasonably necessary to ensure payment of the taxes, despite the fact that a similar cost-imposing burden was
created. Id. at 1373. Moreover, the court implied that the recordkeeping on nontaxable
Indian transactions would be permissible if the state could meet its burden to show such
records were reasonably related to collection of taxes in taxable transactions. Id.
Clearly, the scope of permissible collection procedures is far from settled.
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collections. 178
Although the vendors in Colville were all Indians operating under
tribal licenses, the operative fact was the anticipated effect of state tax
collections on tribal tax revenues. Tribal tax revenues are no less affected by state taxation of tribally-taxed non-Indian reservation businesses. If tribal power to tax these non-Indian enterprises flows from
the same sources as tribal power to tax reservation Indians, 179 the
identity of the tribal taxpayer, by Colville's reasoning, should be immaterial, as long as tribal revenues are impaired by state taxation. In
view of the degree of "foreign" (off-reservation, non-Indian) capital
invested in reservation industry, especially on the energy-rich Rocky
Mountain reservations, this subject will prove fertile ground for new
litigation.
It is in the nature of the judicial process that decisions are not comprehensive, but rather are limited to the facts at hand and to the juris-

178. Even after Colville a state may require precollection of state taxes by Indian
vendors in the absence of a preemptive tribal tax. In such cases will Indian vendors bear
the burden of proving the identity and tax-exempt status of past customers in a state action for back taxes? Will Indian vendors have a good faith defense against state charges
that taxes were wrongfully not collected from certain purchasers? Even if the state bears
the burden of proof, it has the resources to put small-scale Indian vendors out of business by systematically challenging all of their tax-exempt sales and putting them to a
costly legal defense. The state ordinarily would bear the burden of proof as criminal
prosecutor or civil plaintiff, but probably would be able to make a prima facie case simply by showing that some recorded purchasers are not enrolled members of the vendor's
tribe.
179. See Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Barta, 146 F. Supp. 917 (D.S.D. 1956) (in case involving tribal tax levied on non-members leasing tribal land, tribal tax powers described as inherent and recognized by the Indian Reorganization Act). Power to tax is
enumerated in 119 tribal constitutions, and is either unrestricted or expressly made applicable to non-Indians in 112, or 94%, of them. Non-Indians are made expressly
immune from tribal taxation in only five tribal constitutions. Computed by author from
a reading of tribal constitutions collected in G. FAY, CHARTERS, CONSTITIJTIONS AND BY-LAWS OF THE INDIAN TRIBES OF NORTH AMERICA (Museum of Anthropol-

ogy, Univ. of N. Colo., Occasional Publications in Anthropology, Ethnology Series No.
1-16, 1967-1972). After Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), it may be
asked whether tribal taxation of non-Indians, like tribal criminal prosecution of non-Indians, will be deemed "inconsistent with their status" as Indian tribes. Id. at 208 (1978)
(quoting Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976)). The difference is that
tribal power to tax non-Indians was generally recognized by the courts prior to the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act. See, e.g., Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th
Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906); F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 142-43 (1942). It therefore falls within the language of the Reorganization
Act, which authorizes tribes to exercise all powers of self-government "vested . . . by
existing law." 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976). See 55 Interior Dec. 14 (1934) (Interior Solicitor
Nathan Margold's discussion of existing tribal powers, given to aid in interpreting statute).
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diction of the court. Decisions are also reversible. A definite and consistent scheme of regulation is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
Uncertainty over tax liabilities imposes risk and, therefore, cost on
reservation businesses. The very lack of closure in Indian law tax operates as a tax on reservation economic development. Accordingly, litigation is not the best means to resolve overall tax policy.

B.

ContractualResolutions

1.

Tax-collection compacts

A largely unexplored avenue of resolution is the use of tribal-state
revenue compacts. Such an arrangement was made several years ago
between the Oglala Sioux Tribe and the state of South Dakota. The
state agreed to collect its 4% retail sales tax on all reservation transactions, then remit 83% of the yield to the tribe. 180 The 83% figure
repesented a negotiated estimate of the proportion of total sales attributable to Indian purchasers. Based on recent census figures, the population of the Pine Ridge reservation is approximately 70% Indian, 181
so the ratio agreed to by the state and tribe assumes some greater
proportion of income is spent on the reservation by Indians than nonIndians.
The Oglala arrangement simplifies administration, reduces enforcement costs, and minimizes the risk of unexpected tax -liability
and litigation for vendors. This is an indisputable benefit. On the
minus side, parity of reservation and off-reservation tax rates deprives
the tribe of power to control tax incidence and thereby shelter certain
kinds of retail businesses or subsidize the purchase and consumption
of certain goods. The Oglala formula, moreover, generates only about
as much tribal revenue as the tribe could have expected had it levied a
tax at the state rate on Indians alone. The tribe could have levied a
tax on non-Indians as well, increasing its yield. In addition, the Oglala formula compensates each government in proportion to its citi-

180. See Western State Tax Administrators, Indian Taxing Jurisdiction Questions
for the Western States 9, attachment C (Sept. 29, 1976) (statement to American Indian
Policy Review Comm'n summarizing Oglala Sioux compact) (copy on file with Washington Law Review).
181. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION: SUBJECT REPORT:
AMERICAN INDIANS 155 (1973); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION:
SOUTH DAKOTA 43-16 to 43-25 (1973).
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zens' spending rather than its public expenditures. If the government
with fewer but poorer citizens puts out relatively greater per capita
service effort, it will experience a net fiscal loss in the bargain.
An alternative method for revenue contracting is to base the allocation formula on relative revenue needs. Since the tribe may finance a
significant share of reservation services for both Indians and non-Indians, a formula permitting the state to retain reservation tax revenue
only in proportion to its share of total nonfederally financed reservation services might be more equitable.
2.

Service compacts

Tax-collection compacts freeze the tribe into the state's tax
structure and the incidence pattern associated with it, sacrificing tribal control and policy flexibility. 18 2 The state could instead assure
compensation for reservation service costs without imposing its particular tax scheme on tribes through requisition. An agreement could
1 83
govern the measurement of state service costs on an annual basis.
Each fiscal year the tribe would raise revenue to offset those costs in
its own way, through its own tax structure, and remit to the state the
18 4
amount needed to pay for that year's state services.
Through requisition the taxing government loses no regulatory authority and the servicing government can be compensated completely.
However, administrative waste is inherent in such a system of concurrent independent taxation.

182. The tribal flexibility which will be lost includes not only the basic decisions
whether to tax and what to tax, but also the possibility of taxing in addition to state
taxes. With regard to the latter, impact on tribal options is determined by whether the
agreement limits additional tribal taxes and whether the reservation tax base can sustain
tribal taxes in excess of state rates.
183. Congress may intend, however implicitly, that states bear a portion of the cost
of state services on reservations in lieu of federal taxation of states to finance federal

services. Presumably a requisition formula could take this into account, but it raises an
interesting question whether the United States must be party to the agreement.
184. Such a scheme was once recommended as a compromise to resolve the American colonies' tax grievances with the Crown two centuries ago. J. MACPHERSON, THE
RIGHTS OF GREAT BRITAIN ASSERTED AGAINST THE CLAIMS OF AMERICA: BEING AN ANSWER TO THE DECLARATION OF THE GENERAL CONGRESS 52 (London 1776). It was rejected by the Continental Congress only in the fear that the colonies would be encouraged to bid against one another in the determination of their respective shares of total
Continental revenue needs. In the tribal situation this objection disappears.
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C.

FederalLegislative Resolution

All the case law reviewed in this article arose because of the
uncertainty of federal legislation. Clarifying legislation would alter
the current picture dramatically. Congress could make tribal tax authority exclusive in certain subject matter areas or throughout tribal
territory, further qualify tribal tax authority, or qualify or limit state
tax jurisdiction on reservations. Under the circumstances, political
considerations may be expected to prevail over sound policy: votes
will outweigh measurable economic benefits. The recent strong "white
backlash" against tribal government and the small number of Indian
voters may explain why tribes have been reluctant to press for federal
tax legislation. 185 Any federal legislation regarding state and tribal
taxation must consider the following factors if it is to be economically
rational.
1.

Accurate measurement of state costs

New federal Indian tax law should respond intelligently to the economic realities of tribal and state competition for tax resources. The
primary force behind state efforts to tax reservations is concern for
state costs of serving reservation residents. Four measurements must
be made to determine correctly the state's actual net costs:
(1) State share of reservation expenditures. Excluding all federal
formula and project assistance, how many state dollars are actually
expended within the reservation? After deduction of the federal share,
this cost is far less impressive than a cursory reading of state budgets
suggests. A major portion of the cost of public assistance and other
Social Security Act programs is federally financed. 18 6 In addition, Indians qualify for a number of special federal funding programs, many
87
of which are administered by the states.'
185. Cf. H.R. 9054 (proposal to terminate all tribal governments outright), H.R.
9950 (proposal to limit tribal authority to regulation of Indians), 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977). But cf. S. 2362, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (proposal to forbid state taxation of
reservation business where tribe levied comparable tax).
186. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 303 (old-age assistance), 502 (unemployment compensation), 603 (aid to families with dependent children), 622 (child-welfare services), 703
(maternal and child health services), 803 (services for aged, blind, or disabled), 1203
(aid to the blind), 1353 (aid to disabled), 1396 (medical assistance programs) (1976).
187. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-245, 631-647 (impact aid for education), 880b
(bilingual education) (1976); 25 U.S.C. §§ 455-458e (Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act education grants) (1976). See generally FederalDomestic Assistance Programs:HearingBefore the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 95th

Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
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(2) State share of direct reservation taxes. Fee lands and non-Indians' activities are taxed directly by state and local governments. 188 In
addition, many states collect motor vehicle license taxes and motor
fuel taxes from both reservation Indians and non-Indians. Whether or
not such taxes are beyond legal challenge, they are sources of compensating revenue to the states.
(3) Indirect taxes. As illustrated in Figure 4, reservation residents
tend to dispose of most of their income off-reservation because of seFIGURE 4
A SIMPLIFIED MODEL OF RESERVATION FLOWS OF
FUNDS
UNITED STATES
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188. See 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1976) (Indian allottees' land subject to taxation when
held in fee); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 481-83
(1976) (cigarette tax on sales to non-Indians valid). See generally Note, State Taxation
on Indian Reservations, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 132.
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verely limited retail business development and poor investment opportunities at home. As a result, there is a considerable net flow of
reservation consumer dollars into the state. In addition, intense federal funding of tribal government planning and public works results in
accelerated employment of off-reservation non-Indian contractors
and professionals such as planners, lawyers, and engineers. Reservation underdevelopment places the surrounding states in a very favorable balance-of-trade position, with a heavy inflow to the reservation
of state goods, labor, and technology, and a heavy outflow to the
state's private economy of reservation dollars.
Each net dollar the reservation adds to the state economy recirculates, adding several dollars to the state's wealth. Each circulation
also adds to the state's tax base and tax revenues. Depending on the
state's economic structure, an appropriate mathematical "multiplier"
can be constructed to estimate the magnitude of these effects. 189 Tax
revenue from this source is as much revenue collected from reservation output as tax revenue from direct reservation taxes. 190
(4) Reservation tax revenue potential. This amount represents the
total state yield if it could tax reservation residents at parity with offreservation residents. The computation of this amount requires careful consideration. Most reservations are islands of poverty and represent far less per capita income, per capita consumption, and per capita (or per acre) property valuation than surrounding state territory.
189.

For a general discussion of multipliers see R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, sU-

pra note 13, at 504-07. Basic variables in a multiplier are the jurisdiction's effective tax
rates, actual savings rates of income-earners, transactions costs, and level of imports
and exports with other jurisdictions. In each transaction, the dollar's contribution to total output is eaten up or "drained" by taxes and transactions costs, payees' tendency to
save rather than spend the funds again, and the probability that payees will be foreign.
For an interesting application of multiplier analysis to estimate the output effects of
federal spending on reservations see C. Kent & J. Johnson, Flows of Funds on the
Yankton Sioux Indian Reservation, (Ninth District Federal Reserve Bank Information
Series 1976) (copy on file with Washington Law Review), results summarized in D.
GETCHES, D. ROSENFELT & C. WILKINSON, supra note 142, at 442.

190. Obviously, Indians buying goods off-reservation pay state sales and excise
taxes directly. Limiting the analysis only to these direct off-reservation taxes, however,
greatly underestimates the reservation's contribution to state revenues. Suppose, for example, that state consumers save only 20% of their income, the average effective rate of
state and federal taxes is 20%, and there is a net import of goods of 10%. Using a simple multiplier limited to these variables (ignoring money supply and transactions cost
effects), these factors predict that every dollar added to the state economy contributes
$6.90 to the state's gross product. Each dollar circulating in the state's economy which is
attributable to the reservation (which would not be present but for the reservation) becomes part of the "indirect tax base." State tax revenues derived from this base, less
state expenditures attributable to the transactions in this base, are the state's net indirect
tax benefit from the reservation.
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In Washington state, for example, 30% of reservation Indian families
are below the poverty level, compared with 9% of all families in that
state. 191 Figure 5 compares the reservation populations of five states
in terms of relative poverty and tax potential.
The net current cost of a reservation to a state is the state's share of
reservation expenditures less direct and indirect taxes. The measure of
state fiscal loss, however, is reservation tax potential, up to but not
exceeding its cost. There is no policy reason why the state should be
able to overcompensate itself by taxing reservations over cost, in light
of the pressing economic needs of the reservation. Similarly, if state
cost exceeds reservation tax potential, the state could not expect to be
fully compensated even if the reservation were "terminated" and became an ordinary county. At tax parity the reservation simply could
not pay its way. In every state poorer districts enjoy more state expenditures than they can pay for. On the basis of data currently available,
it is impossible to estimate confidently the extent of state losses so
measured. Figure 5 compares estimated state expenditures and reservation tax potential for five states, relying on a number of simplifying
assumptions. Without measurement of direct and indirect taxes such
comparisons are inconclusive.
2.

Federalpoliciesfor allocationof state costs

A rational federal program for reconciling state and tribal tax administration on a burden theory would begin by estimating state losses
more precisely. It would then determine what proportion, if any, of
these losses the United States will require states to bear in lieu of federal taxes for the support of tribes. All wealthy states now bear higher
federal taxes to support federal programs in poor states; there is a net
interstate redistribution of wealth inherent in our national tax system.
Congress could, but does not now, simply require wealthy states to
serve neighboring low-income areas of poor states. The net economic
effect would be about the same, although the total administrative cost
of such a system might exceed the cost of a single national tax and
welfare program, and there would be local variations in the kinds and
quality of services rendered. Requiring the surrounding state to bear
all or part of its losses in serving the neighboring reservation would be
similar.
191.

THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION: SUBJECT REPORT:
128 (1973); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION:
49-60 to 49-61 (1973).

BUREAU
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FIGURE 5
COMPARATIVE RESERVATION TAX POTENTIAL
AND SOME SELECTED STATE EXPENDITURES, 1975a
0

Type of tax potential/
state expenditure

INCOME TAX POTENTIAL OF
RESERVATIONS
Tribalb families as a percent of all families
Tribal families' income as a percent of all income
Tribal income tax potential ($ millions)c

$

PROPERTY TAX POTENTIAL OF
RESERVATIONS
Reservation nontrust land as per cent of state area
Estimated state tax collected on reservation
nontrust land ($ millions)d
Reservation trust land as per cent of state area 3
Estimated tax potential of trust land ($ millions)

o

0.5

4.0

3.0

7.8
10.0
19.4

21.5
5.0
35.8

72.0

95.0

1.6

1.6

2.1

0.3

0.3

0.3

3.0
2.4
1.1

1.0

3.0

6.5
33.0
214.0

SALES TAXES AND TAX POTENTIAL,
TRIBAL FAMILIES
Average state sales tax burden per $1000 income
Estimated state tax collected by off-reservation
merchants from tribal families ($ millions)c
Estimated tax potential of on-reservations sales
to tribal families ($ millions)
SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED RESERVATION
TAX POTENTIAL
Estimated state
tax collected from tribal families
($ millions) f

o..

90.0
8.9

27.0 f03.0
0.6

1.4

8.9

0.6

1.6

2.1

Estimated tax potential of reservation sales,
property and income not now taxed ($ millions)

$

$ 216.0

49.8

21.0

37.9

SOME SELECTED STATE EXPENDITURES
ON TRIBAL FAMILIES
Estimated total AFDC payments to tribal families
($ millions)s
h
Same, state share

$
$

6.4
2.0

2.2
0.7

3.3
0.7

3.7
1.3

1.6
0.7

Estimated total state public education cost for
tribal families ($ millions) i
Same, state share J

$
$

25.7
9.7

5.6
1.5

17.2
5.1

4.8
1.5

14.5
1.0

Estimated state share of tribal families AFDC
and education cost ($ millions)

$

11.7

2.2

5.8

2.8

1.7

a. Sources: BUREAU OF THE CENsUs, 1970 CENsUs OF POPULATION: SUBJEcr REPORT: AMERICAN INDIANS (1973); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STAISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 1975; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL AND STATE INDIAN RESERVATIONS

(1974).
b. As used here, "tribal means reservation Indians. Since title census data is available for res- •
ervation Indians as such, the figures here are drawn from the census category "Rural Indians,"
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Alternatively, Congress could place subsidization of poor reservations on the same footing as subsidization of poor states, legislatively
relieving the states of any legal duty to serve reservation residents
while expressly authorizing tribes to apply for direct federal formula
funding of all tribal services. This is the better solution. It is far more
parsimonious administratively, avoids conflicting concurrent state
and tribal administration of reservation services, and strengthens tribal self-determination. In the long run it also might benefit the concerned states, for it would spread the cost of reservation subsidization
among all fifty states instead of concentrating it in the states that happen to circumscribe reservations, and it would allow states bordering
reservations to enjoy a favorable balance-of-trade without having to
pay for reservation services directly.
VI.

TRIBAL TAX ADMINISTRATION

Either in the belief that it will improve their ability to challenge
state taxation or in response to the rapidly expanding revenue needs
of growing populations, tribes are drafting tax codes in unprecedented
numbers. It is to be hoped that, in haste, sound policy is not sacrificed. Through careful predraft research and planning, tribes can
avoid unpleasant consequences such as unintended business flight, undesirable redistributions of income, diseconomies in administration,
which is nearly equivalent. Any error will be in the direction of overestimated reservation tax
potential and state expenditures.
c. Tribal income potential was computed as follows: tribal income was broken down into
$2000 brackets and, with the use of state income tax schedules, the average tax per family in
each bracket was calculated and multiplied by the number of tribal families in the bracket. Finally, the total tax payable by each bracket was summed. South Dakota and Washington have no
income tax.
d. Very approximate, based on average tax burdens per acre in each state. Since reservation
lands are relatively undeveloped, any error should be in the direction of overestimated reservation
tax potential.
e. Very approximate, based on the assumption that about 80% of all spending by tribal families is off-reservation. The regressivity of the sales tax was not taken into account for lack of
adequate data to make adjustments; any error should be in the direction of underestimating taxes
paid or potentially payable.
f. Based on sales taxes alone. No estimate of property taxes paid on-reservation by tribal families on nontrust land was possible.
g. Based on average monthly payments reported by each state and number of tribal families
receiving AFDC.
h. Based on federal funding assistance formula.
i. Assumes equal state expenditures on Indian and non-Indian pupils' basic education and
excludes all special educational programs and costs for Indian education alone. Most special programs are federally-financed.
j. Estimated from average per-pupil federal assistance through Impact Aid and JohnsonO'Malley programs. Actual formula varies among school districts based on valuation and tax effort. Excludes all federal Indian education funds restricted in 1975 to use in supplemental, as
opposed to basic education programs.
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and taxpayer rebellion. Consistent sources of revenue, combined with
a suitable plan of public services and capital improvement, can improve tribal members' welfare and win the support of resident nonmembers.
A.

Planning Tribal Taxes and Other Revenue Sources

The threshold question for tribal officials considering a revenue tax
program is whether the tax is necessary. All tribes have revenue needs,
but taxation is not the only option they have to meet those needs.
Among their alternatives are federal formula assistance, federal discretionary grants, liquidation of tribal assets, and development of
profitmaking tribal enterprise. The attractiveness of each alternative
depends upon its relative cost. The cost of a funding source includes
the expenses of application and administration; risk of nonfunding,
lost funding, or, in the case of tribal enterprise, business loss; restrictions on use; accountability; and, where substantial tribal capital and
resources are committed, the cost of foregone alternative opportunities.
Any source of revenue also will have a characteristic incidence affecting income distribution. Federal funds, for example, tend to
require a large planning and evaluation component and therefore
benefit professional employees. Tribal enterprise tends to create new
jobs for unskilled and semi-skilled workers. A tax, depending upon its
structure, will tend to redistribute income from taxed to nontaxed sectors. If the incidence of a revenue source is undesirable, it must be
considered a cost of that revenue. The tribe should prepare for each
alternative revenue source a yield projection (for a tax, this is the tax
rate multiplied by the taxable base, adjusted for expected tax-related
changes in demand); an estimate of the cost of administration, including the anticipated cost of tax delinquency; and an analysis of incidence.
Once a tribe has identified a revenue goal, such as N dollars to construct a new community health center, it should rank all alternative
sources of N dollars in order of cost and choose the mix with the
greatest expected net value. If the tribe has a number of independent
revenue needs over several fiscal years, it should choose that mix of
revenue sources over time that meets all of its needs at the lowest ag92
gregate cost.1
192. "Linear programming" is a widely-used mathematical tool for selecting the
optimal mix of public investments and expenditures under given constraints such as
maximizing net benefit and keeping total cost below some specified ceiling. Elementary
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Since tribes are small their public budgeting process tends to be
"lumpy," that is, aggregate expenditures differ greatly from year to
year. One year a multi-million dollar community hall is built, then for
two years no capital additions are made. Larger government units
such as states are so diversified and manage so many different projects
simultaneously that their aggregate revenue needs grow at a fairly
even pace. Thus, while a state must plan on raising about as much
revenue each year, and tends to either hold or advance its tax rates, a
tribe may be tempted to allow its tax rates to float with the ebb and
flow of its budget. This may be a serious mistake. Individuals and
businesses make financial commitments, such as buying a new car or
introducing a new product line, on the basis of expected future income. If the tax rate is widely variable, uncertainty as to future income will chill consumption and investments just as surely as a high
tax. A better strategy than a "lumpy" tax, then, is to estimate the average future annual needs of the tribe, establish that as the annual
revenue goal, and simply reinvest overcollections in slow years for
withdrawal and expenditure in busy years. 193
B.

Some General Considerationsin Tribal Taxation

Tribes are sometimes best thought of as very small underdeveloped
countries with special fiscal characteristics quite different from those
of the states. One feature of underdevelopment is a low savings rate:
people do not accumulate much private surplus capital for reinvestment. As a result, there is really very little to tax; tax revenues, after
deduction of the expenses of administration, may be too small to accomplish any significant public purposes. 194 Where most residents
have about the same level of income, moreover, there is no point in
levying a redistributive (progressive) tax.
applications of linear programming are explained in J.

KEMENY,

J.

SNELL,

& G. THOMP-

SON, INTRODUCTION TO FINITE MATHEMATICS chs. 6-7 (2d ed. 1966). The definitive appli-

cation of this tool to problems of finance and expenditure policy is H. WEINGARTNER,
MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING

AND THE ANALYSIS

OF CAPITAL BUDGETING PROBLEMS

(1963).
193. Tribes are too small to attempt to achieve fiscal stability through tax policy,
however. Their economies will always ebb and flow in servitude to state and national
growth.
194. Another problem associated with reservation smallness and underdevelopment is a very high net import of foreign (state) goods. When imports are high and income accordingly tends to flow out of the jurisdiction, the multiplier for public expenditures within the jurisdiction is relatively small. Tribes thus suffer both from a small tax
base and low effectiveness of expenditures.
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Taxing reservation businesses, especially those which are non-Indian or off-reservation owned, might be the easiest and best source of
revenue. Taxing only businesses, however, is not necessarily the answer. When tax costs increase, business taxpayers try to shift them to
employees and customers. If the tax costs which they are unable to
shift exceed their cost of relocation, they move, depriving the jurisdiction of both tax base and employment. Tribal business taxes are therefore to be levied with caution. To a certain extent they will be reflected in lower wages and higher prices on the reservation; this effect
will be greatest where tribal labor is unorganized and alternative retail
outlets for tribal consumers are remote. The tribe must also know
how far it can go before triggering business flight. 195
Like underdeveloped countries, reservations tend to be best at attracting and holding semi-skilled, labor-intensive assembly industries
because of cheap labor, and raw materials or primary products industries such as mining and timber because of abundant, relatively cheap
resources and energy. These are industries that can little afford to relocate at present. If resources dwindle, however, or reservation wages
approach parity with off-reservation wages, reservations' attractiveness to these industries will weaken, and the industries' taxability
will decline. This problem will remain until tribes enjoy higher growth
and savings rates and begin to attract more technical and professional
jobs.
Another revenue alternative is tribally owned and operated
businesses. The use of tribal business enterprise to raise revenue has
been widely adopted but not very thoroughly evaluated. 196 Because of
their governmental eligibility for federal development assistance programs, tribes often are able to attract development capital at a lower
cost than individual reservation entrepreneurs. In many instances,
195. Businesses are held to a location principally by sunk capital and opportunity
costs. Capital is sunk where it cannot be recovered or liquidated; a factory with little
resale value or potential for functional conversion is an example. Opportunity costs are
the costs of foregoing investment alternatives. The opportunity costs of moving off a
reservation include foregoing the lower wages and cheaper raw materials available on
reservations.
196. See generally STAFF OF AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, supra note
1.One peculiar disadvantage of tribal enterprise is reduction of the tribe's eligibility for
federal revenue-sharing programs based on local tax effort. A tribe that operates a factory and diverts 10% of the gross into public programs does nothing different, really,
than one that imposes a 10% gross receipts tax on private business. The latter is.
counted as tax effort, however, and the former is not. 31 C.F.R. § 51.22(a) (1978). See
also 31 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)-(b) (entitlement formula includes local tax effort), 1221(2),
1227(b)(4), 1227(d)(1) (eligibility of tribes for federal revenue sharing) (1976).
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tribes already own critical raw materials such as timber, water, and
fossil fuels. Finally, tribes are immunized from federal and state taxation, although substantial growth of tax-free tribal economic enterprise probably will stimulate new challenges by federal tax administrators.
A tribal enterprise can adjust its wage scale, payroll, and capital
budget to yield any number of mixes of benefits for tribal members.
The payroll can be deliberately enlarged, thus increasing mean and
median reservation income at the expense of net enterprise revenue.
Instead of taking a share of the profits of a private (or public) enterprise through taxation to pay for income supplements, the Indian enterprise simply pays higher wages or employs more people. This eliminates the administrative cost of maintaining a separate government
assistance program. On the other hand, it inflates wages and, unless
carefully regulated, makes it too costly for private firms relocating on
the reservation to attract labor.
However accomplished, the generation of a reliable stream of public revenue is a requirement of tribal government. The challenge of
the next decade will be resolution of the jurisdictional uncertainties
that render tribal revenue planning virtually impossible.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The power to tax is a requirement of government. Its proper scope
can never be ascertained by reference to abstractions of law and
semantics. Legal formalism in judicial treatment of Indian tax issues
has led to economically peculiar results and threatens to deprive tribes
of the power of regulation and planning by means of taxation, to impose uncertainty costs, legal risks, and duplicative taxes on reservation taxpayers, and to overcompensate states and the United States
beyond their service or expenditure effort. A thorough study of state
and tribal tax structures and revenue needs is needed before clarifying
legislation can be drafted. In the meantime, it is incumbent on the
courts to regard more seriously the real effects of erosion of tribal territorial taxing powers rather than the neatness of rules and distinctions.
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